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Abstract 
In the wake of increased globalization with undertakings strategically targeting their 
production and logistics across borders for profit maximization and optimal cost 
reduction, competition for consumers’ business is fierce, whereby pressures on players 
can be the impetus for collusion and anti-competitive agreements to obtain better profit 
margins and market power outside what is dictated by supply and demand in free 
market economies. Violative undertakings are becoming increasingly savvy at keeping 
their activities secret due to the negative stigmatization and severe fines that attach to 
such behaviour upon detection. This makes uncovering evidence of said behaviour 
increasingly difficult as companies go to great lengths to remain imperceptible, until 
such time that stakes become intolerably high and the fear of detection becomes 
irrefutably plausible that undertakings will admit or acknowledge their participation in 
collusive activities to circumvent the impact of stringent sanctioning. The leniency 
program has emerged as a stealth tool in the fight against competition disruption as it 
utilizes time and fear as conduits to obtain complete exoneration from severe fines in 
exchange for evidence that successfully leads to the initiation of an investigation to 
uncover said anti-competitive infringement. But as the severity of fines attached to this 
type of unlawful behaviour increases, the expectation that predictability and 
transparency will be implemented in procedural protocol and investigatory policy 
intensifies, to assure proper protection of a Defendant’s fundamental rights to enhance 
the efficacy and sustainability of leniency programs. This article makes the case that 
proper protection of Defendants’ fundamental rights, through the enhancement of 
procedural predictability and increased evidentiary transparency, will lead to more 
efficient, efficacious and sustainable leniency programs equating to more fear of 
violative behaviour detection, an increased acknowledgment of anti-competitive 
participation, and enhanced overall cartel destabilization for more balanced competition 
in the marketplace.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the complexity of successfully identifying, investigating and uncovering indicia of 
anti-competitive behaviour in the marketplace, the leniency program has proven to be a 
lucrative tool as it drives cartel participants towards acknowledging participation in 
activities that disrupt competition in free market economies, and aides competition 
authorities in collecting the adequate evidence necessary for destabilizing and punishing 
hard-core cartel infringement. Cartels operate outside the auspices of regulatory 
detection, because undertakings are fully aware that they will face serious sanctioning 
and fines upon detection, as the anti-competitive conduct they engage in increases 
market prices, decreases product quality and innovation, and degrades overall consumer 
welfare. Over the past decade, the European Commission, Member State’s National 
Competition Authorities and other comparative jurisdictions around the globe have 
identified these activities as particularly egregious and pernicious, whereby they have 
increased the stakes and fear of detection by attaching significant fines and penalties to 
said offenses. But with the deliberate transition towards larger sanctioning comes the 
increased expectation that competition authorities will implement more transparent and 
predictable procedural regimes to reap the benefit of penalties that both prevent future 
destabilizing behaviour and deter recidivist anti-competitive practices. With 
implementation of more transparency and predictability in procedural protocol comes 
the necessary protection of Defendants’ fundamental rights to ensure institutional policy 
will be upheld against heightened judicial scrutiny. This article argues that competition 
authorities must enhance the predictability of sanctioning, increase the transparency of 
procedural protocol, and fervently safeguard a Defendant’s fundamental rights if they 
are to increase cartel destabilization and usage of the leniency program, demonstrate 
the viability of cartel detection and imposition of severe sanctioning, and develop a 
successful penal system that balances punishment with prevention.  
In Chapter 1, the author will explain the two methodological research approaches 
that were utilized when developing investigatory and evidentiary recommendations for 
modification to existent national competition policy and procedural regimes. Said 
recommendations will be developed and analysed throughout the article for the overall 
enhancement of leniency programs concurrently with safeguarding a Defendant’s 
fundamental rights.  
In Chapter 2, the author will describe the impact economic principles have on 
competition law by targeting market power, different economic model structures, and 
how pressures on players can lead to anticipatory decision-making in oligopolistic 
markets. Game theory will be utilized to predict when companies will compete or collude 
with each other for maximization of profit and efficiency gains and how fear of detection 
can destabilize cartels for the potential of immunity or reduction of severe sanctioning.  
In Chapter 3, the author will introduce the concept of leniency, its benefits for 
both the authorities and cartel participants, and its ability to destabilize cartels and 
intensify competition in the marketplace. The author will then traverse between different 
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jurisdictional program structures and competition regimes, highlighting how said 
differences impact investigatory strategy, decision-making analysis and penalties 
imposed on infringing undertakings. The Chapter will conclude with a reiteration of the 
foundational cornerstones of leniency, why the interplay between said program 
elements creates a dynamic of increased participation in the leniency program, and why, 
with increased penal severity, the obeisance of Defendants’ rights becomes paramount 
to the transparency and predictability necessary for decreased cartel behaviour and a 
more efficacious leniency program.  
In Chapter 4, the author will further underscore the salient link between the 
severity of sanctions, the incentives of the leniency program, and the necessity of 
safeguarding a Defendant’s rights to ensure the structural integrity of investigatory 
protocol and subsequent findings of infringement destabilizing the market. The author 
will discuss the powers conferred on the European Commission to carry out its duties 
and the different fundamental rights that attach to its procedural regimen, narrowly 
focused on the preliminary investigatory stage. This section will discuss the different 
types of rights available to Defendants, when said rights attach, and why each right will 
assist undertakings in the proper preparation of their defence in the adversarial stages. 
In summation, this Chapter will assimilate the foundational law necessary for use in the 
following chapter regarding whether a Member State’s search warrant protocol can 
withstand heightened procedural scrutiny in relevance to a Defendant’s rights when 
examining the evidentiary context, subject matter, purpose and scope of the underlying 
investigation.  
In Chapter 5, the author will explain Member State’s parallel competencies and 
delve into provisions of Latvian Competition Law in relevance to its investigatory warrant 
procurement, by analysing shortcomings in its Article II Section 9 and Article II1 Section 
10 provisional language via comparison with High Court recommendations and Saeima 
amendment proposals. The author will then utilize comparative methodology to explore 
the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Act warrant provisions to glean 
important differences and challenges related to Defendants’ rights protection for 
introduction of best practices for modification of said provisional language. This Chapter 
will finish with four targeted recommendations on how Latvian Competition Law can be 
modified to better safeguard a Defendant’s rights at the investigatory stage and increase 
overall participation in the leniency program due to strengthened procedural protocol.  
The author will conclude by linking all the interworking components introduced 
within the constructs of the article by incorporating the underpinning of game theory 
and oligopolistic economic strategy, collating all the divergent system structures and 
leniency regimes, and tying in all the rules of law and provisional recommendations from 
the previous chapters to provide final recommendations on how to strengthen leniency 
programs by and through safeguarding a Defendant’s fundamental rights in furtherance 
of market competition within the European Union. 
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CHAPTER ONE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
a. Introduction to Research 
To develop an in-depth understanding of the overt differences between 13 European 
Member State jurisdictions, the European Commission (“EC”), and the United States of 
America (“US” or “USA”), in relevance to the procedure and structure of their leniency 
programs and the extent to which each protects a Defendant’s fundamental rights in 
competition proceedings, two methodological approaches were employed for 
interpretation and comparative analysis. As evidence was uncovered regarding different 
system structures, decision-making vehicles, investigatory methods, courtroom 
procedure and transparency/predictability of the leniency process, three salient issues 
emerged for which one is the basis of my article and the other two will be suggested as 
additional areas of academic research that can be conducted in furtherance of 
strengthening existent EU leniency programs. 
b. Two Methodological Approaches to Article 
To extract differences among the leniency programs, semi-structured questions were 
developed to delve into specific areas of interest with subjective follow-up questions 
being formulated and utilized during each interview, or from each correspondence, to 
hone in on the salient issues acting in derogation of a Defendant’s fundamental rights. 
Each of the salient issues were then examined by using legal comparative analysis of 
primary and secondary sources regarding European rules of law and US legal 
precedence to discern the main legal authoritative differences and to posit 
recommendations for potential areas of system improvement to enhance the protection 
of Defendants’ rights and to increase the efficacy and impact of the existent leniency 
programs in both Central and Eastern Europe.  
i. Semi-Structured Interview Questions – Qualitative Approach 
1. National Competition Authorities 
To develop the initial semi-structured questions, a preliminary review of the European 
Commission (“EC”) and of 24 National Competition Authority (“NCA”) websites, including 
the Austrian (“AT”), Belgian (“BE”), Bulgarian (“BG”), Croatian (“HR”), Czech (“CZ”), 
Cypriot (“CY”), Danish (“DK”), German (“DE”), Estonian (“EE”), Finnish (“FI”), Hungarian 
(“HU”), Icelandic (“IS”), Irish (“IE”), Latvian (“LV”), Lithuanian (“LT”), Macedonian 
(“MK”), Maltese (“MT”), Norwegian (“NO”), Polish (“PL”), Slovakian (“SK”), Slovenian 
(“SI”), Swedish (“SE”), Turkish (“TK”) and British (“UK”) competition divisions, was 
conducted to study jurisdictional differences in relevance to leniency and protection of 
Defendants’ fundamental rights.  The gaps of information identified in said websites 
included the following areas of legal interest to which semi-structured questions were 
developed to uncover additional legal system data for further legal analysis and 
interpretation: fining system and structure, settlements and informants, 
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quantification/estimation of harm, implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU, leniency 
program structure, two-tier vs. divided systems, purely administrative vs. purely 
criminalized systems, severity and pervasiveness of the cartel problem, and the 
intersection between collusive pressures on market players and game theory. Each NCA 
listed above was initially contacted via telephone with a follow-up email being directed 
to the head of its cartel/investigative division listing the aforementioned semi-structured 
questions and requesting a meeting time be scheduled for a phone or in-person 
interview at headquarters. 13 jurisdictions responded to the initial email request in the 
following ways:   
The 13 respondents were categorized into four separate and distinct groupings 
designated by how each preferred to respond, including email correspondence, phone, 
Skype, and in-person interviews at headquarters. The first set of respondents provided 
insight regarding the interworkings of their respective NCAs via email correspondence 
employing the initial targeted email as a guide to format their responses.  Said 
responses were reviewed and analysed, and follow-up questions were posited via email 
to delve deeper into further areas of legal interest utilized in this article.  The NCAs that 
utilized this method of correspondence, included:  CY, CZ, HR, HU, SE, and TR. The 
second respondent set provided information via phone interview, preparing for the 
interview using the initial targeted email as a guide and allowing for follow-up questions 
to dissect the information given providing the author the opportunity for further 
extrapolation on specific areas of legal interest. The NCAs that utilized this method were 
AT and DE. The third respondent set provided information via Skype interview, allowing 
for an unstructured question and answer session in which many legal issues were 
posited, developed and expounded on for an in depth understanding of each legal area 
of interest.  The NCA that utilized this method was NO. The fourth set of respondents 
provided the greatest platform for developing a solid knowledge base by providing the 
opportunity for an in-person interview at headquarters.  Here, the NCAs and author 
were able to delve deeper into each issue of law, extrapolate on examples of specific 
issues/challenges the NCAs were facing when enforcing competition law, and identify 
areas where modification of EU/national law could lead towards more efficient and 
competitive market outcomes. The NCAs that chose this method were IE, LT, LV and PL.  
From the above interviews, the issue of potential harmonization regarding the 
proper usage of leniency documents between departments of the same and different 
systems failed to be considered by the legislature in Directive 2014/104/EU and will be 
recommended for further research to better delineate proper documentary protocol to 
safeguard victims’ rights concurrently with protecting leniency documents to ensure 
enhanced cartelist participation in existent leniency programs. All notes taken during the 
above interviews were reviewed in light of the demands posed by the current article 
topic and all relevant information was extracted for use in the article. Each NCA director 
provided personal contact information and offered their assistance if any follow-up 
questions transpired during the later stages of article creation and submission. 
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2. Law Firm / Legal Practitioners 
Law firms were also contacted to identify unique issues faced by legal practitioners 
defending companies alleged to have infringed competition law and destabilized 
competition in the internal market. Most law firms enter the competition proceedings 
directly after the commencement of a dawn raid or investigation, such that they can 
ensure the protection of the Defendant’s rights during and after the cartel investigation 
and discern what if any issues to raise with respect to evidence collection, transparency 
of the infringement findings and other subsequent parts of the proceedings. 
Unsurprisingly, the information gleaned from interviewing with legal practitioners 
uncovered the last two of the three respective issues addressed in this article.  
The first interview conducted was with an associate of bnt attorneys-at-law 
located in Riga, LV who focuses his practice on joint ventures, M&A, competition and 
state aid, and EU regulatory affairs. The issues discussed during the interview were of 
the potential goals and challenges related to the future implementation of Directive 
2014/104/EU and of the transparency of documents requested and utilized in civil 
follow-on cases.  The second interview was with a partner of Vilgerts Legal & Tax in 
Riga, LV who concentrates her practice on employment, corporate and competition law. 
The issues discussed were of the LV leniency program, the LV Statement of Objections 
(“SOO”) and the complexity of the economic analysis relied on by the Court, the cultural 
influence on whistle blowing in prior Communist nations, and on Defendants’ procedural 
rights. The third interview was with an associate with Sorainen in Riga, LV who 
concentrates her practice on the intricacies of competition law and who was the prior 
head of the LV NCA cartel division handling dawn raid investigations stemming from 
alleged infringements of competition in the LV/EU internal market. The issues discussed 
were of the LV leniency program and cartel investigations, the inadequate scope of LV 
search warrants, the full copying of computer content, LV NCA limitations on dawn raids, 
the protection of Defendants’ human rights, and the jurisdictional differences regarding 
the usage of search warrants. 
From the above interviews, the salient issues of (1) overbroad search warrants 
and (2) inadequate transparency in SOOs surfaced as potentially violative of Defendants’ 
fundamental rights. Pursuant to the hierarchical weight the author placed on each of the 
aforementioned issues, the focus of the article will be on identifying and developing 
recommendations on proper pre-investigatory protocol for obtaining search warrants in 
accordance with safeguarding Defendants’ fundamental rights; the issue of the lack of 
transparency in SOOs will be recommended as an area of further research for proper 
formulation of thresholds to ensure Defendants can fully understand the contents of the 
SOO and develop a proper defence to the NCA’s allegations of infringement. Thus, 
based on the evidentiary depth to which each can advance the targeted issue and focus 
of the article, the following NCA’s investigatory/evidentiary competition procedure will be 
highlighted below in the appropriate and relevant legal sub-categories: DE, IE, and LV. 
All notes taken during the above interviews were analysed and all relevant information 
was utilized in the article. Each practitioner provided personal contact information and 
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offered additional assistance if any follow-up questions surfaced during the later stages 
of article drafting. 
3. US Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission 
Similar to the above approach utilized when comparing and analysing different NCA 
jurisdictions, the US Department of Justice - Antitrust Division (“USDOJ”) and the 
Federal Trade Commission-Bureau of Competition’s (“FTC”) websites were reviewed to 
compare with European national competition regimes and identify best practices in 
relevance to pre-investigatory procedure and effective enforcement mechanisms.  The 
ultimate goal of said multi-jurisdictional comparison will be to recommend methods 
European NCAs can employ for improvement of current pre-investigatory procedural 
protocol and overall goal attainment towards enhancing national enforcement of existent 
competition law and increasing participatory acknowledgement of cartelist behaviour 
inflicting the internal market.  
ii. Primary/Secondary Source Analysis – Comparative Approach 
In complement to the above semi-structured interviewing, each issue subsequently 
underwent a thorough examination by and through researching and comparing targeted 
primary/secondary multi-jurisdictional resources including the European rules of law and 
US legal precedence critical to determine the main authoritative differences for both the 
identification of best practices utilized in each market and the presentation of 
recommendations for potential areas of system improvement. Proper footnoting and 
bibliographical citations followed each source utilized in the article.   
c. Concluding Remarks: Goals of the Two Methodologies   
As elicited above, two methodological approaches were utilized to extract salient 
circumstances where persistent Defendants’ rights violations can decrease the efficacy 
of the leniency program and increase the likelihood that secretive, violative behaviour 
will be exacerbated in the marketplace. This article posits that action taken and 
deference paid towards upholding Defendants’ rights is the necessary step towards 
enhancing cartel destabilization, as the future vision of an effective leniency program lies 
in the purview of evidentiary transparency, procedural predictability and participatory 
acknowledgement.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  ECONOMICS OF CARTELS AND 
COMPETITION LAW 
a. Background and Goals of Competition Law 
In free market economies, competition law is designed with the inherent interest and 
focus towards fostering, preserving and protecting competition in the marketplace.1 
Because in free market societies, the distribution of resources relies on the natural 
movement and interplay between supply and demand2, protection of competition aides 
in creating market efficiencies, including: achieving a decrease of market prices, an 
enhancement of product/service quality and consumer choice, an increase in innovation, 
an aligned production/supply output level supported by demand, a higher degree of 
targeted response to “public tastes”, and an overall strengthening of consumer welfare.3 
With competition equating to “a struggle or contention for superiority…competition has 
been described as a process of rivalry between firms…seeking to win consumers’ 
business over time”4; this becomes even more pronounced when assessing the impact 
and level of market elasticity and transitional consumer loyalty influencing targeted 
product/service segments internationally.5   Summarily, market competitors can achieve 
increased profits and turnover by producing high quality products at reasonable prices; 
alternatively, companies that deliver low quality products coupled with excessive prices 
can be: “punished” by losses in sales, inflicted with overbearing costs, or eliminated 
from the market due to inefficient economies of scale or inability to effectively compete.6  
This forces companies to cater to the “wishes and preferences of the opposite side of 
the market” or bear the negative consequences of resisting the interdependent 
components of free market competition.7 
                                           
1 A. Jones, and B. Sufrin, “EU Competition Law:  Text, Cases, and Materials” (United Kingdom:  
Oxford University Press, 2014), 5th edition, Chapter 1, pp. 1-2.  
2 Ibid, p. 2. 
3 R. Folsom, “European Union Law in a Nutshell” (Minnesota:  West Nutshell Series, 2014), 8th 
edition, Chapter 8, p. 336.  
4 UK Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission (now the Competition and Markets 
Authority), “Merger Assessment Guidelines – September 2010”, para. 4.1.2, CC2 revised and OFT 
1254, currently available on: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1254
.pdf, as found in D. Bailey and R. Whish, “Competition Law” (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 7th edition, Chapter 1, p. 3. 
5 Ibid, see Bailey and Whish. 
6 Bundeskartellamt - German Competition Authority website, “Advantages of competition as an 
organising principle”, available on: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/AboutUs/Bundeskartellamt/bundeskartellamt_node.html#do
c4548786bodyText1.  
7 Ibid. 
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Even with the overt budgetary/financial, production/logistical and 
innovation/technological enhancement that results from said generated efficiencies, 
corporations may still take the position that competition is inconvenient and problematic, 
or that they simply cannot effectively compete in their respective market segment.8 In 
some instances, said acknowledgement can be the impetus for companies to collude 
with their key competitors, impede the natural progression of supply and demand, or 
take strides towards eliminating analogous competition.9 Because of the covert nature of 
anti-competitive corporate practices and the complexity of initiating/facilitating 
successful investigations leading to findings of infringement/convictions, competition law 
aims to dismantle anti-competitive agreements, destabilize abusive market behaviour, 
ensure against harmful merger concentrations, and scrutinize State enablement towards 
intervening and distorting the market.10  Summarily, without competition law, consumer 
welfare would be openly exposed to harmful practices causing inflated pricing and 
reduction of choice, and there would be a notable decrease in quality of administration, 
limited or nominal sustainable growth and reduction in internal job security, and a 
subsequent decrease of overall efficiency in the internal market. 
b. Study of Economics and its Intersection with Competition 
Law 
To develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of competition and in turn why 
companies engage in certain decision-making patterns in the market, one must 
understand the direct relationship between competition policy and its inclusion of 
economic principles, with specific importance focused on corporate strategy, economic 
behaviour and the dynamics of market power.11 Market power is important as it creates 
the ability for a dominant firm to charge a higher price than dictated by supply and 
demand (usually by “reducing its output or by making competitors reduce theirs”), 
translating into the power to “raise a price above the marginal cost” to produce the 
product in the short run, and “above the average total cost” to produce the product in 
the long run, which can lead to “supra-normal profits” for a notable period.12 To 
understand how market power is created, maintained and manipulated by firms, one 
must also appreciate the dynamics of consumer surplus (i.e. the resultant benefit 
derived from the difference between what a patron is willing to pay vs. what s/he 
actually paid), production costs (i.e. the cost the firm incurred to produce each product 
and the potential returns/increased productivity for incurring said cost), profit 
maximization (i.e. to only “produce up to the point where the additional costs of 
producing one extra unit of output are still covered by the additional revenue 
                                           
8 Ibid, “Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC)”. 
9 Ibid.  
10 See Chapter 1, pp. 2-3, Supra note 5.  
11 J. Faull and A. Nikpay, “The EU Law of Competition” (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 3rd edition, Chapter 1, p. 3. 
12 Ibid, p. 10.  
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earned…”), economies of scale (i.e. a higher production capacity will lead to a reduction 
in average total costs vs. the concentration percentages of efficient firms in the market 
in tandem with the optimal level of internal production for positive market outcome), 
and the usage of entry barriers (i.e. the way prices can be increased concurrently with 
entry barriers eliminating easy entry by firms to exploit the additional demand at a 
higher price).13 In light of the above dynamics, firms can strategize, exploit and 
manipulate their economic behaviour in “defence of their market” to enhance their 
market share for increased profits in furtherance and/or in derogation of free market 
competition. It is important to note that an increase in market share by a dominant firm 
does not automatically destabilize competition in the market, as some firms are just 
superior at developing/selling products that consumers want to purchase automatically 
giving them a larger share of the market through competition; it is when a firm enters 
into anti-competitive agreements, or abuses its dominant position in the market, when it 
is in violation of competition law.14 Thus, one must look at the type of market a firm is 
conducting business in and the types of pressures market participants face to predict the 
strategies they will employ to compete amongst their peers.  
To develop a better overall perception of the pressures faced by players in a 
particular market, one must attain a more in-depth understanding of the different 
theoretical economic model structures and how each works to either benefit or harm 
consumer interests; the following analysis will distinguish between perfect market, 
monopolistic and oligopolistic competitive economic structures. Perfect market 
competition exists where there are many buyers and sellers, each firm is small relative 
to the market and all the players in the market produce similar non-differentiated 
homogeneous products; buyers and sellers have perfect information, there are no 
barriers to entry (so if a profit is made, new entrants can enter the market and drive 
down the price), no firm has any real advantages over the others, and consumers view 
the products/services as perfect substitutes.15  All firms charge the same price for the 
goods/services and the price is determined by the intersection of the market supply and 
demand curves; both producers and consumers are price takers, and no one firm will be 
able to influence the market price as the price is perfectly elastic.16  Here, the demand 
curve for a firm’s product or service is simply the market price and if a firm were to 
increase their price even by only a nominal amount, it would cause buyers to go 
elsewhere for the product, as there is no loyalty in a perfectly competitive 
marketplace.17 In Monopolistic markets, there is only one supplier in a market with 
                                           
13 Ibid, pp. 10-18.  
14 United States Department of Justice website, “Antitrust and You”, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you. 
15 R. Flood and D. Hewitt, “Microeconomic and Data Analytical Theory– In-Class Notes, Handouts 
and Test Preparatory Materials”, College of William and Mary – Mason School of Business Student 
Web Portal, as found in C. Kollmar, “RGSL RF 104: Micro/Macro Economics Exam”, submitted on 
3 November 2014.   
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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numerous buyers, the supplier will be a price setter and “market demand is [will equate 
to] the demand for the company’s product”; through the manipulation of production 
output the supplier “can determine the market price along the [product’s] demand 
curve”, and there are entry barriers that prevent the entry of any competitors ultimately 
creating the potential for the supplier to maximize profits above cost and pursue other 
market destabilizing goals.18 Here, the supplier can manipulate competition by reducing 
output and selling less product than demanded in the market, thereby driving up the 
price and creating a “dead-weight welfare loss” as consumers lose the benefit of any 
consumer surplus including “a transfer of income from consumers to [the] monopolist”.19  
It can be argued that monopolies do bring positive competitive aspects to the 
marketplace when referring to production efficiency gains, increased investment in 
innovation and a decrease in negative consumptive externalities, but persistent 
monopolistic profits weighed against any arguable market benefits “must be seen as 
something negative which competition policy should try to avoid”.20  
Oligopolistic competition exists where there are between 2-10 firms serving many 
customers based on strategic concentration ratios, the supplier’s provide either 
differentiated or homogeneous products, and there are barriers of entry that exist 
forming overt obstacles disallowing strategic analogous competitor entry; the main 
differentiator in this economic model is that a single firm chooses a efficacious output 
level before competitors select their production plan with the leader’s output being 
where profits are maximized.21 Thus, the main focus between the oligopolistic economic 
model and other economic model structures is that companies operating in oligopolistic 
markets act on the belief that their individual strategy “concerning output, price, etc. 
[and innovation] has a perceptible influence on the market outcome and…provokes 
reactions from the side of competitors”.22 Given the complexity of behaviours in 
oligopolistic markets, and the amount of firms that operate in said markets, competition 
policy must be geared towards identifying and developing legal authority that accounts 
for factors that increase/decrease competition and promotes anti-collusive, pro-
competitive behaviour in the marketplace to safeguard consumers’ interest.23 
Furthermore, because the oligopolistic economic model structure most closely aligns 
with the posturing of competition law in the current internal market, the focus of the 
article will be on the competition and decision-making of market participants in 
oligopolistic markets. When discerning how oligopolistic firms strategize and make 
decisions for the development of policy promoting “fierce competition”, one can make 
use of non-cooperative gaming models to identify the conditions and factors existent for 
collusive behaviour to arise among market players and how pressures on the players 
                                           
18 See Chapter 1, pp. 21-24, Supra note 11. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 See Supra note 15.  
22 See Chapter 1, p. 25, Supra note 11. 
23 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
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and the frequency of interactions can force decisions based primarily on 
financial/budgetary bottom-line impact and fear of detection.24 
c. Non-Cooperative Game Theory 
Game theory analyses “situations of strategic interaction using mathematical models” by 
identifying the relevant market players, the information they possess or for which their 
decision can be based, the selected actions they can choose from and the timing of said 
actions, and the particular numerical payoffs each selection will award each player.25  
For the game to elicit an equilibrium, a player must select a “plan of action that 
maximizes his payoffs based on the information available to him and his expectations 
about his rival’s actions”.26 These theoretical models accurately reflect competition policy 
as their underpinning relies on the expectation that players will not be able to make 
binding anti-competitive agreements as they are unenforceable (and illegal) pursuant to 
law, and any strategies invoked by players will be chosen by the anticipated actions of 
their competitors.27 Moreover, when decisions of a company lead to a “self-reinforcing 
set of strategies in which each strategy is the best response to the other strategies [of it 
rivals]” this is called a Nash equilibrium28; a Nash equilibrium produces a “stable” 
outcome when companies maintain their chosen strategy and “a firm cannot increase its 
own profit by choosing an action other than its equilibrium action”.29 If analysed under 
the purview of the two differentiated models of competition (i.e. Bertrand and Cournot 
competition models), the Bertrand competition model assumes that “each company in 
the market decides on its price assuming that other prices in the market will remain 
unchanged…[featuring] a market price equal to marginal cost in the case of 
homogeneous products, and a price that is higher in the case of differentiated 
products”; the Cournot competition model assumes that “each company in the market 
decides on its profit maximizing output assuming the other’s output will remain 
unchanged… [featuring] a market price below the monopoly level but (well) above 
marginal cost”. 30  It is believed that the two aforementioned models reflect the way 
companies are expected to strategize and compete utilizing assumptions pursuant to the 
specific competition model chosen. 
To provide a ‘general’ example of how game theory works when analysing 
collusion in the legal “criminal” realm, the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma will be illustrated 
below and will later be extrapolated on when applying the intricacies of said game to 
                                           
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid, p. 26.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, pp. 26-27.  
28 D. Yao and S. DeSanti, “Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion”, pp. 113-141, 
The Antitrust Bulletin, 1993, as cited in See Supra note 11, p. 26. 
29 Tirole, “The Theory of Industrial Organization”, n.1, p. 206, as cited in Chapter 1, p. 26, Supra 
note 11. 
30 See Chapter 1, pp. 27-28, Supra note 11. 
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cartelists’ collusive behaviour in oligopolistic markets. In the instant Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (see below), there are two prisoners (Prisoner A and Prisoner B) alleged to have 
committed the crime of Premeditated Murder in the 1st Degree with Deadly Weapon 
Enhancement; each has been arrested and taken into custody. Due to the inadequacies 
of the underlying investigation (including a lack of concrete and/or circumstantial 
evidence), the investigating officer must elicit testimony from each prisoner to 
determine guilt for the prosecutor to attain a conviction. Each prisoner will not be 
allowed to collude, converse or create any binding agreements with the other prisoner 
prior to or during the interrogation of the investigating officer.  Each must make his/her 
decision on what to tell the officer based on what s/he believes the other will reveal 
during the interrogation. If only one of the prisoners “snitches” (i.e. testifies) against the 
other prisoner; the snitching prisoner will be released and the other will get 28 years of 
incarceration for Premeditated Murder in the 1st Degree with Deadly Weapon 
Enhancement (i.e. Class A Serious-Violent Felony, presuming a 0 offender score (i.e. no 
prior criminal history)); if both prisoners refuse to snitch on each other, each will only 
get one and ½ years of incarceration under the conviction of Illegal Possession of 
Firearms in the 1st Degree (i.e. Class B Non-Violent Felony, presuming 0 offender 
scores); if both prisoners snitch on each other, each will get 13 years under the lesser 
included offense of Murder in the 2nd Degree (i.e. Class A Serious-Violent Felony, 
presuming 0 offender scores, with no weapon enhancement and a downward departure 
for investigative preferring prior to trial):31  
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 
                                           
31 Ibid, pp. 28-29; the entirety of the instant citation includes both the description of the 
prisoner’s dilemma game as well as the matrix that follows.  This game matrix illustrates how 
game theory works in the prisoner’s dilemma setting, which will be utilized later for comparative 
purposes when determining players’ strategies in relevance to collusive cartelist behaviour in 
oligopolistic markets. The payoff structure used in the instant game was replaced with the actual 
years of incarceration denoted in the 2015 Sentencing Guidelines of the State of Washington in 
the US to develop an example more true to life, and arguably more reflective, of a prisoner’s 
actual decision making process when facing a foundational serious violent offense. (The State of 
Washington Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual is available at: 
http://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/SentencingManual/Adult_Sentencing_Manual_2014
.pdf) 
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As one can see from the above game, the most lucrative strategy for both Prisoner A 
and Prisoner B is to snitch on each other. This is true because snitching awards the least 
jail time irrespective of what the other prisoner decides to do.  When both prisoners 
benefit by doing the same action, this action is considered to be the “dominant” 
strategy.  In the instant case, the dominant strategy is for both prisoners to snitch 
against each other for the lesser-included offense (i.e. decreased sentence) of 13 
years.32  The author will now analyse if the game of Prisoner’s Dilemma remains 
constant when applied to collusive cartelist behaviour in an oligopolistic marketplace. 
d. The Uncovering and Destabilization of Cartels 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices.”33 
From a definitional perspective, cartels are “agreements or concerted practices between 
two or more undertakings aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour…in order to 
maximize their profits”.34 The motive of a cartel is to achieve enhanced future profits 
and more lucrative efficiencies than what would otherwise be dictated by supply and 
demand by agreeing with each other to reduce production or fix a more generous price 
for similar products in elastic markets; this can only be achieved if each cartelist abides 
by the schematic rules in place to preserve the equilibrium of the cartel.35 Said 
schematic strategy is invoked in countless illegal ways, including: fixing purchase 
prices/contractual selling prices, manipulation of production output, reallocation of 
market share, bid-rigging (the most serious offense), import/export restrictions and 
other collusive conduct.36 Similar to other types of fraud, cartel behaviour creates the 
“most serious breaches of competition law” by invoking a continual misallocation of 
resources (i.e. capital and income) and causing harm to consumer interests, as cartelists 
“are doing so [committing offenses] only with the motivation of greed and with nothing 
to be gained but financial profit”.37 
Making it increasingly more difficult and complex to investigate, cartel behaviour 
is conducted in secrecy as many firms are becoming progressively savvier with 
circumventing competition law to continue their violative behaviour for more handsome 
                                           
32 Ibid. 
33 A. Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, 205 (William 
Playfair ed., 1995), 1776, as cited in P. Botana “Prevention and Deterrence of Collusive Behavior:  
The Role of Leniency Programs” (2006/Winter), Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 48.  
34 R. Grasso “The E.U. Leniency Program and U.S. Civil Discovery Rules:  A Fraternal Fight?” 
(2008/Spring), Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 568-571.    
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 D. McFadden and Gorecki, “Criminal Cartels in Ireland:  the Heating Oil Case” (2006), ECLR 
631-640, p. 640, as cited in D. McFadden, “Some Thoughts on Criminalizing Cartels”, p. 4, 
Presentation at the European Competition Day, Budapest, 29-30 May 2011.  
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profits.38 This is accomplished by employing internal legal advisors for insight on the 
intricacies of competition law, utilizing encrypted technological advancement during 
phone calls and email correspondence, meeting in obscure undetectable locations, 
hiding internal documents in “constitutionally” protected buildings, premises and 
personal chattel, and employing other devious measures to keep silent specific internal 
cartel agreements.39 Cartelists operate in secrecy because they know what they are 
doing is against competition policy, and if detected will face serious sanctioning, fines, 
penalties and potentially jail time depending on which jurisdiction they conduct their 
business in, and whether said jurisdiction is purely administrative in nature or invokes 
criminal prosecution/penalties for illegal collusive behaviour. Because severe fines, 
sanctions and penalties are the main driver behind keeping collusive practices secret, 
the fear of detection becomes one of the key components behind destabilizing cartels.40 
This is because individual cartelists will never know if and when other cartel members 
will give away the secret details of the underlying collusive schema, ultimately exposing 
the ongoing illegal behaviour and enabling the opportunity for authorities to lodge penal 
sanctioning and fines against violative companies (and in certain jurisdictions against 
individual directors).  The author will now illustrate, by creating a hypothetical coffee 
cartel, how game theory can explain cartelist’s decision making in oligopolistic markets 
by assuming abidance to the rules of prisoner’s dilemma. 
In the instant game, the world’s largest coffee producing countries formed a 
coffee cartel with the aim of driving up the wholesale price of coffee beans, whereby 
they agreed to withhold tons of coffee beans off the market.  Countries A (Brazil and 
Columbia) agreed to withhold the most beans as they were the largest contributors in 
said market; Countries B (other smaller countries) agreed to withhold smaller quantities 
of beans off the market. At harvest time, instead of the prices being higher and more 
lucrative, they plunged below the level of profitability expected.  This is because “each 
has a dominant strategy to break from the deal and supply more (i.e. dump) beans on 
the market to take advantage of the higher profits, thereby forcing prices to plunge 
downward”:41 
 
                                           
38 Czech Republic Office for the Protection of Competition website, “Leniency and Settlement 
Information Bulletin 3/2013”, available on: https://www.uohs.cz/en/information-
centre/publications.html.  
39 Ibid.  
40 European Commission website, “ICN Curriculum Project – Learning Module on Leniency”, 
video, available on: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html#video. 
41 R. Flood, and D. Hewitt, “Game Theory – In-Class Notes, Handouts and Test Preparatory 
Materials”, College of William and Mary – Mason School of Business Student Web Portal. This 
citation includes both the explanation of the game and the matrix illustrating the pay-off matrix. 
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Coffee Bean Cartel Game 
 
 
 
As one can see from the instant game, the most lucrative strategy for both Countries A 
and Countries B is to dump beans on the market (i.e. compete) due to the “temptation” 
of attaining a better overall profit margin; when one of the Country players abides by 
the cartel agreement and withholds beans off the market (thereby ensuring higher 
prices), it makes it more advantageous for the other Country player to dump beans on 
the market to take advantage of the resultant higher profits it can make when the prices 
are high (i.e. 12 million EUR total vs. 10 mil EUR total).42 Moreover, when the other 
Country player breaks away from the agreement, it no longer makes good business 
sense to continue withholding beans, thereby making it more profitable for the 
withholding Country player to not maintain a restriction on its own production (i.e. 7 
million EUR total vs. 5 million EUR total).43 This is true because competing, awards the 
most beneficial outcome irrespective of what the other Country players decide to do (i.e. 
7 million EUR). When both Country players benefit by doing the same action, said action 
is considered to be the “dominant” strategy; here, the dominant strategy is for both 
Country players to compete against each other irrespective of the lower resultant price. 
Thus, if both Country players simply cooperated with each other on their collusive 
agreement they would have enjoyed a higher combined overall profit margin (i.e. 10 
million EUR), but instead they end up with an “equilibrium with the lower collective 
profit” (i.e. 7 million EUR).44  This illustrates the theoretical instability of a cartel, as the 
“collusive outcome creates the possibility to free ride or cheat on the cooperative 
behaviour of the others [inciting the increased possibility of snitching and fear of 
detection], as witnessed in practice by the breaking down and erosion of many cartel 
agreements”.45  
The above coffee cartel example effectively provides an instance where the 
dominant strategy was for both players to deviate from the cartel agreement, but in 
other circumstances collusive agreements may be upheld and will not align with the 
                                           
42 See Chapter 1, pp. 29-30, Supra note 11, and Ibid.  
43 Ibid, p. 29. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, p. 30. 
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aforementioned logic.  The reasons for this are that in oligopolistic markets the players 
have the potential opportunity to meet numerous times and “play the game” more than 
once potentially making it more profitable to collude to not forego future revenue.46 
Additionally, when taking into account the impact of different cultures and mentalities, 
there could also be different expectations in relevance to upholding agreements where 
collusion between companies might not necessarily be seen as something criminal in 
nature and trust exists between colleagues to abide by cooperative agreements.47  Thus, 
when applying game theory to real oligopolistic situations, there are a number of factors 
that must be considered to discern what market players will actually do when faced with 
the decision to compete or uphold a collusive agreement. Said factors that enhance the 
“ease” for which companies can coordinate collusive terms are: increased market 
transparency, a greater frequency of company interactions, stronger entry barriers, 
greater excess capacity, increased demand growth and the presence of a ring leader; 
factors that ‘decrease’ the longevity of cartel collusion are: a large number of market 
suppliers, notable product differentiation, greater market share asymmetry and cost 
asymmetry, and enhanced innovation/R&D.48 To make matters even more complex, 
firms can also employ collusive “facilitating devices” such that implementation can aide 
in the collusion between market players, which includes: trade associations, price and 
contract clause cooperation, cross patents and research, and common resale price 
maintenance and costing book allocation; said factors/facilitating devices can influence 
the payoff structures of game theory by “reducing the gains of competing” making it 
more profitable to collude to reap the benefits of higher profits and generation of 
revenue.49  
e. Concluding Remarks: Game Theory as the Underpinning 
of Leniency  
The aforementioned economic/financial principles and prisoner dilemma games illustrate 
that there are a number of factors at play when determining whether or not a firm will 
compete or collude with its analogous competitors in an oligopolistic market, which will 
undoubtingly change the decision-making each cartelist will employ to enhance its own 
financial status or bottom line. However, the main instigators of action that remain 
constant, irrespective of all the permutations/combinations of factors and devices used 
by firms to increase the efficacy and strength of cartel agreements, is the instability 
introduced by the inability to rely on another cartelist’s actions regarding (1) if and when 
it will cheat and free-ride on the benefits ensued by others withholding their production 
output or (2) when the fear of detection is strong enough to drive another cartelist (or 
its employees) to snitch or reveal cartel behaviour for leniency or alternative personal 
                                           
46 Ibid. 
47 J. Jerneva, “In-Person Interview”, Partner with Vilgerts Legal & Tax – Riga Office, interview 
conducted on: 23 September 2015, and Ibid, p. 31. 
48 See Chapter 1, pp. 32-33, Supra note 11.  
49 Ibid, pp. 33-34. 
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gain. This is precisely why game theoretical models are utilized to discern and potentially 
predict the factors that will motivate and instigate cartelists to act in favour of immunity, 
lower fines and/or decreased penal sanctioning when they believe the stakes are too 
high to continue their participation in collusive agreements undermining competition in 
the market.  
For final demonstrative purposes, when applying the above rules of prisoner’s 
dilemma to the leniency program: the first cartelist who admits its own cartel 
participation concurrently with revealing the participatory actions/behaviours of others 
will get full immunity (i.e. no fines or jail time) and the others will get 100 million EUR in 
fines (or more depending on the severity and duration of the cartel); if both cartelists 
refuse to admit cartel participation, each will receive 200 million EUR in fines when the 
EC or NCA investigates and enters a finding of cartel infringement (i.e. belief in the 
inherent likelihood that the authorities will discover cartel behaviour is a cornerstone of 
the leniency program); if both cartelists later admit cartel participation after 
commencement of an investigation, each will receive 50 million EUR as a reduction in 
fines for engaging in continual and consistent cooperation with the EC/NCAs for 
favourable treatment via settlement.50 But one must remember that even though the 
fines were reduced to 50 million EUR, said fines still significantly impact the profit 
margins of the firm, such that the race to secure first place in the queue becomes the 
dominant strategy to achieve maximum utility. Thus, the leniency program introduces 
the principle of speed/timing for complete immunity treatment in competition 
proceedings, which ultimately impacts game dynamics and payoff structures.51 The 
following game illustrates the above leniency program elements: 
 
Leniency Programme Game 
 
In summary, pursuant to the rules of game theory as the underpinning of the leniency 
program, the dominant strategy for each cartelist “in terms of…maximum…utility” is to 
be the first to admit its participation in a cartel agreement to benefit from complete 
                                           
50 See Supra note 38.  Specifically review citation two at the bottom of page four of the bulletin 
where it describes how game theory is the underpinning of the leniency program.  
51 Ibid. 
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immunity.52 This is because the “race” or timing component towards being the first 
admitting cartelist proves to be the most lucrative option for complete exoneration of 
fines/sanctions, and not the reduction in fines, as each cartelist is on an equal footing to 
obtain full immunity only if they are first in the “queue” with the EC or NCAs. Thus, 
“timing” and severity of fines (i.e. financial impact) becomes the determining factor in 
both the dominant strategy and payoff structure of the above game (i.e. both players 
will have to perform the same action to obtain a favourable payoff, but the actual timing 
of the action defines whether the participant will benefit from maximum utility or a 
reduction of the same). In the next chapter, the Author will describe in greater depth 
the goals, mission and purpose behind the leniency program through comparing the 
unique and distinct differences between three NCAs, the EC and the USDOJ in relevance 
to their competition regimes and leniency program structure.   
                                           
52 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  LENIENCY PROGRAM REGIMES:  A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
a. Structure and Purpose of the Leniency Program 
Evidentiary information positioned to initiate cartel proceedings for alleged infringement 
can be provided or revealed to the EC, USDOJ and the European NCAs in a diverse 
number of ways, but the most successful and prolific tool in the effective enforcement 
against cartel behaviour has been the advent of the leniency program.53 As highlighted 
above, because of the inherent secrecy for which cartels operate to remain undetected 
and circumvent high fines, sanctions and jail time, there is a notable level of conspiracy 
as cartelists are aware that their behaviour is illegal; this makes it incredibly difficult for 
authorities to discover, investigate and obtain the requisite amount of evidence to 
successfully prosecute cartels.54 The leniency program provides authorities with a vehicle 
“to uncover cartels that may have gone undetected and continued to harm 
consumers”.55 The leniency (i.e. cartel immunity) program creates a system in which a 
firm receives complete exoneration from all penalties in exchange for participatory 
admission and complete cooperation throughout the cartel investigation and 
proceedings.56 This corroborates game theory’s underpinning with leniency as it is the 
fear of detection and the desire to circumvent potential sanctioning that drives market 
participants to utilize the leniency program as a tool of vindication.  
The cornerstones of an effective leniency program are: (1) there is a sincere 
“threat of severe sanctions for those who participate in…cartel activity and fail to self-
report”, (2) there is a perceived “high risk of detection by antitrust authorities if they 
[cartelists] do not report”, and (3) there must be overt “transparency and 
predictability…throughout a jurisdiction’s cartel enforcement program so that companies 
can predict with a high degree of certainty how they will be treated if they seek 
leniency” and the appending punishment for not doing so.57 The leniency program also 
creates a “preventative dimension” by creating an inherent “climate of permanent 
suspicion between cartel members [,] which not only maximizes the inherent instability 
                                           
53 S. Hammond, “The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last Two Decades”, p. 
1, National Institute on White Collar Crime presentation, Miami, 25 February 2010, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download.  
54 Bundeskartellamt, “Effective Cartel Prosecution:  Benefits for the Economy and Consumers”, p. 
17, available on: 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Brosch%C3%BCren/Brochure%20-
%20Effective%20cartel%20prosecution.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12. 
55 See Supra note 53, p. 2.  
56 See Supra note 40. 
57 S. Hammond, “Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program”, presentation given before the 
ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs, Sydney, 22-23 November 2004, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.htm., as found in Supra note 53, p. 4.  
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of cartels but…also…discourages companies from engaging in such behaviour…”.58 This 
program is seen as a win/win for both the companies and authorities alike, as the firm 
who is the first to admit participation in a cartel receives complete immunity; the 
authorities receive inside evidence regarding the interworkings of a cartel harming 
consumers that they would not have been privy to without the leniency program 
incentives. Moreover, the premise that underscores the importance of the leniency 
program is that enhanced competition will equate to fewer cartels and “all the benefits 
that competition brings:  lower prices, better service, more innovation and greater 
consumer choice”.59 Summarily, the leniency program provides the opportunity for 
authorities to detect and punish more cartels, and in turn, there will be a greater overall 
level of legal deterrence because of the salient public demonstration that cartels will be 
targeted and harshly punished.60 The leniency program regime displays subtle but 
notable distinguishing differences across distinct jurisdictions internationally; this article 
will cover the differences between the competition regimes of the EC, and three NCAs, 
including: IE, DE and LV, in comparison with the USDOJ. Moreover, the below 
subsections will explore the differences not only between leniency programs, but also 
between distinct competition system structures, and laws relied on by antitrust 
authorities, as said differences reveal the aforementioned challenges with pre-
investigatory measures and procedural enforcement vehicles necessary for efficacious 
leniency regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.  
b. The EC Regime and the ECN 
i. EC Leniency Regime 
Competition policy in the EU is derived from two central rules proscribed in Article(s) 101 
and 102 of the TFEU61; Article 101 prohibits both horizontal agreements (i.e. 
agreements between firms operating “at the same level of the supply chain”) and 
vertical agreements (i.e. agreements “between firms operating at different levels”), and 
Article 102 prohibits firms from abusing their dominant position in the marketplace.62 
Regarding anti-competitive practices prohibited by Article 101, both the EC (and EU 
                                           
58 See Chapter 8, pp. 1080-1081, Supra note 11.  
59 See Supra note 40.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article(s) 101 and 102, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&from=EN,. It 
should be noted that Article 101(1) deals with concerted business practices and agreements 
when they have the “potential to affect trade between MSs and have the object or effect of 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the Common Market”, thereby making 
them prohibited; said practices, including horizontal price fixing, bid-rigging, market sharing, etc. 
are punished as “hard core infringements” as iterated in many primary and secondary sources 
(see Supra note 3).  
62 European Commission – competition website, “Overview”, available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html.  
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NCAs) can apply Article 101 through usage of Regulation 1/2003, which lays out general 
EU competition procedure, and the investigatory and sanctioning powers against 
infringing firms (among a cadre of other protocol proscribed in the legislation).63 Even 
though for many years it was the practice of the EC to award a reduction in sanctions to 
cartelists who admitted their participation in anti-competitive practices, it wasn’t until 
1996 when the EC formalized its leniency program/procedure, which included two 
subsequent revised notices/amendments to better enhance its policy of rewarding 
favourable treatment for cooperation in furtherance of cartel detection and competition 
enforcement.64 The Commission’s 2006 Notice on Immunity from fines introduces the 
premise that due to the complexity that attaches to the detection and investigation of 
cartels, it is in “Community interest to reward undertakings…which are willing to put an 
end to their participation and co-operate in the Commission’s investigation…as ensuring 
that secret cartels are detected and punished outweigh the interest in 
fining…undertakings that enable the Commission to detect and prohibit such 
practices”.65   
The basic EC leniency program structure allows for the first undertaking that 
admits its participation, and voluntarily presents its knowledge/role in an existent cartel, 
to receive a complete exoneration from administrative fines; it must be noted that the 
only sanction that the EC can impose, due to its competition regime being fully 
administrative, is fines for a finding of competition infringement.66 To obtain full 
immunity (i.e. 100% exoneration of fines) a firm must provide evidence that will enable 
the EC to either (a) “carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the alleged 
cartel”, or (b) “find an infringement…in connection with the alleged cartel”.67 It is 
important to note that subsection (b) allows for immunity to be obtained after an 
investigation has ensued if the information will enable the EC to find a competition 
infringement, but there will be a higher threshold required to obtain said immunity than 
in the pre-inspection stages; this practice distinguishes the EC from other international 
competition regimes that only allow for immunity in instances where the evidence 
provided serves as the impetus for commencement of an investigation.68  When a 
cartelist wants to approach the EC to admit its participation in a cartel, it must first 
establish which jurisdictions the cartel is operating in, which authorities may be 
interested in pursuing an investigation, and obtain full company support to move 
                                           
63 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ C 326, available on: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=EN, and Ibid, 
“Procedures in Anti-Competitive Agreements”. 
64 See Chapter 8, p. 1081, Supra note 11. 
65 European Commission, “Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in 
cartel cases”, OJ C 298, pp. 17-22, 8 December 2006, available on: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006XC1208(04)&from=EN.  
66 See Supra note 40.  
67 See Supra note 65.   
68 Ibid. 
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forward with filing an application for immunity.69 EC procedure dictates that a cartelist 
must work with diligence and speed to obtain and maintain the first marker (i.e. first 
position in the queue of cartelists willing to elicit evidence and admit participation in an 
existent cartel) to safeguard its chance of obtaining full immunity; complete and genuine 
cooperation is expected throughout the totality of the pre-investigatory/ investigatory 
stages, and the cartelist cannot have coerced others to participate in the cartel.70 
Information that must be provided to the EC is what product or market the cartel is 
operating in, the firms/companies involved, names of individuals/directors participating 
in the cartel, any benefits derived from being in the cartel, any penalties for failure to 
abide by cartel rules, names of the parties who are responsible for the cartel’s monetary 
compliance, and an overall description of the motive behind the cartel.71 Full cooperation 
that must be displayed by the cartelist throughout the duration of the proceeding 
equates to refraining from conduct that can undermine the investigation, it must not 
inform others of the immunity application, it must discontinue participation in the cartel 
(unless continued participation is requested by the EC to circumvent tipping off others of 
the investigation), it must not destroy or modify evidence, it must ensure full 
cooperation of all employees/staff of its company and it must not misrepresent evidence 
or act dishonestly during the proceeding.72 “Indicators of cooperation” expected when 
collaborating with the EC are attending EC meetings, submitting supplemental evidence 
upon request of the EC, decoding company encryptions/acronyms, conducting internal 
investigations and forwarding an accurate report of the findings, and providing truthful 
testimony during proceedings.73 Once the investigation and any formal proceedings have 
concluded, and the EC is satisfied that the immunity applicant fulfilled all its 
responsibilities, the conditional immunity designation will transition into full immunity 
from all fines for both the company and individuals alike.  
Cartel participants that do not fulfil all the requirements to receive full immunity 
treatment (because they were not the first cartelist submitting a leniency application, 
they could not produce the required evidence for full immunity, or they coerced others 
to participate in the cartel) can receive partial immunity or a reduction of fines, if they 
disclose their own participation, fully cooperate, and pointedly contribute to the ability of 
proving an infringement by providing evidence that represents significant added value 
(“SAV”) in comparison with the existing evidence.74 It should be noted that SAV defines 
“added value” in relevance to evidence submitted to the EC that actually “strengthens, 
by its very nature…the Commission’s ability to prove the alleged cartel”; it must also be 
considered that not all evidence holds the same weight for band reduction purposes (i.e. 
direct, contemporaneous compelling and stand-alone evidence holds more merit than 
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non-corroborated, indirect and circumstantial evidence). In such cases, firms will receive 
predictable band reductions that align with the following protocol: 2nd cartelist in the 
queue that can provide information of SAV will get a 30-50% reduction in overall fines; 
3rd cartelist will receive a 20-30% reduction, and the 4th or subsequent will receive up to 
a 20% band reduction in fines; it is important to note that there is no cut-off for the 
number of participants requesting and receiving reductions in their fine, which is another 
critical distinction between the EC’s regime and other global competition regimes.75 
What is most important is the cartelist’s ability to provide evidence of SAV diminishes 
with each additional cartelist admitting its participation and providing evidence.76  
To fully appreciate what band reductions equate to in terms of fines, to 
underscore the deterrent effect said fines have from a preventative prospective, or as an 
impetus to initiate an immunity application, one must go to the EC’s guidelines on the 
method of setting fines pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003, which 
accounts for a “percentage proportion of the value of sales…[and] the degree of gravity 
of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of the infringement”, but 
provides that the legal maximum “fine shall not, in any event, exceed 10% of the total 
turnover in the preceding business year of the undertakings…participating in the 
infringement”.77  There are adjustments made to the calculated total both upward (i.e. 
when accounting for aggravating circumstances) or downward (i.e. when considering 
mitigating circumstances), but the ultimate goal of the fine is to possess an inherent 
“deterrent effect, not only in order to sanction the undertakings concerned [,] but 
also…to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that is 
contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty”.78 Of course, it is posited that the fine 
cannot be disproportionate or set outside the purview of the offender’s ability to pay, 
ultimately forcing the firm into insolvency, as it would be against Community interests 
and well outside the retributive threshold aimed for in competition infringements.79 
Summarily, the EU leniency program provides an attractive incentive for firms 
participating in cartels to receive maximum utility and escape severe sanctioning by 
proffering evidence of infringing competition activity as reflected above in the payoff 
structures of game theory in oligopolistic markets;  it must however be emphasized that 
for successful participation in the leniency program, cartelists must understand and be 
able to rely on the results of the cartel proceedings through unwavering adherence to 
both transparency and predictability. In addition, because cartel infringement cases are 
often not limited to just one jurisdiction, or region of the internal market, it makes it that 
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much more important to develop ways to harmonize efficient leniency program structure 
between jurisdictions to ensure said predictability traverses successfully between distinct 
NCAs/EC for successful enforcement of competition law. 
ii. European Competition Network (ECN) 
It is well established, that NCAs have parallel competencies to those of the EC, whereby 
pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003 they must apply Article(s) 81 and 82 (currently, TFEU 
Article(s) 101 and 102) to destabilize anti-competitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance issues plaguing the internal market; in furtherance of the aforementioned 
goal, a joint statement was entered between the Council and Commission making it 
clear that “all competition authorities are independent from each other [and 
that]…cooperation between NCAs and with the Commission takes place on the basis of 
equality, respect and solidarity”.80 Due to infringement cases appearing at a more 
transnational level and stealthily penetrating national borders, it became critical that the 
EC and NCAs developed ways to cooperate with each other to finesse strategies of 
investigation, exchange views on case analysis, and harmonize competition procedure to 
construct “an effective mechanism to counter companies which engage in cross-border 
practices restricting competition”.81   
The ECN was established as a forum that initiates cooperation between the EC 
and NCAs to “ensure an efficient division of work and an effective and consistent 
application of EC competition rules”; the ECN provides an effective platform for 
multinational authorities to: inform each other of “new cases and envisaged 
enforcement decisions”, assist and coordinate with each other on complex 
investigations, exchange pertinent evidence and other investigatory-related leads, and 
deliberate on areas of multi-faceted mutual interest.82 As highlighted above, because the 
leniency program has been proven to be the most prolific tool in the fight against cartel 
infringements, the adoption of the leniency program has received strong transnational 
political support and promotion, as more than 25 NCAs are prioritizing ECN membership 
and promulgating legislation in furtherance of the principles posited in the 2006 ECN 
Model Leniency Program (MLP) to ensure further collaboration towards enhanced cartel 
destabilization and increased multinational competition.83 The MLP has become a 
significant step towards fostering “convergence and consistency” between different 
competition regimes, ultimately decreasing the amount of discrepancy between 
jurisdictions, to ensure potential leniency applicants will not be dissuaded from applying 
                                           
80 Council of the European Union, “Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the 
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due to a lack of procedural predictability.84 Even though the MLP is “soft law” (i.e. quasi-
authoritative with no legally binding force) it provides the much-needed framework to 
assist MSs with the harmonization of the “essential procedural and substantive 
requirements” necessary for all MS’s leniency programs to simplify and make more 
predictable complex cases with multiple filings in different jurisdictions.85  Summarily, 
the MLP provides a structure to which NCAs can align their legislation, but it is left in the 
purview and competence of the distinct MSs to adopt a competition regime that is most 
aligned with the expectations of their national constituency to bolster their respective 
leniency programs in protection of their individual domestic markets.86 The author will 
now explore the overt divergences in the structures of three different MS’s competition 
regimes and the salient differences between each structure’s procedural protocol.  
c. The NCA Regimes:  A Closer Look at DE, IE and LV 
i. Introduction:  Council Regulation No. 1/2003 
The NCAs obtain their parallel competencies with those of the EC pursuant to Regulation 
No. 1/2003, which emphasizes in its Preamble the principles of a system that ensures 
against distorted competition, must be applied “effectively and uniformly” such that the 
NCAs and MS’s courts are empowered to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty “where 
they apply national competition law”.87  Moreover, Regulation No. 1/2003 does not 
preclude MSs from “implementing on their territory national legislation, which protects 
other legitimate interests… [if it] is compatible with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law”; MSs are also empowered to promulgate stricter territorial 
NCA laws that “prohibit or impose sanctions on unilateral conduct engaged in by 
undertakings… [or] on abusive behaviour towards economically dependent 
undertakings“.88  Summarily, Regulation No. 1/2003 provides the authority for NCAs to 
initiate, investigate and find competition infringements pursuant to TFEU 101 and 102 
via national legislation, and it allows MSs the discretion to promulgate legislation and 
create procedure in alignment with what is most appropriate in their distinct 
jurisdictions, provided they uphold the general tenets set forth in Community law.  For 
illustrative purposes, the author will now explore the differences between three NCAs 
(e.g. DE, IE and LV) in relevance to how they created their competition regimes and 
constructed their leniency programs; the audience should identify the strides MSs have 
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taken towards attempting to harmonize aspects of competition law in reflection of 
Regulation No. 1/2003 and Art. 101 and 102 of the TFEU, but also understand where 
regime differences are revealed, challenges have surfaced in terms of transparency, 
predictability and the irreverence towards Defendants’ fundamental rights. The 
competition constructs of the below jurisdictions will also reveal differences between 
regimes that are purely administrative vs. fully criminalized or a combination of both, 
and systems that are bifurcated (i.e. separate chamber systems where there is an 
independent investigative body and infringement decision making body) vs. a two-tiered 
system (i.e. the investigative body makes a decision on the finding of an infringement 
based on the evidence it uncovered).  
 
1. German Competition Authority 
Pursuant to DE’s designation as a EU Member State, its Federal Government in 
conjunction with its NCA “The Bundeskartellamt” (hereinafter, “BUND”) has the authority 
under Regulation No. 1/2003 to develop national law in furtherance of the principles set 
forth in TFEU Articles 101 and 102 (formally Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty).89 In 1958, 
the BUND instituted the “Act against Restraints of Competition” (hereinafter, “ARC”) as 
its central legal basis to protect competition in DE, which perfectly mirrors the TFEU; it 
has been amended eight times to enhance its ability to destabilize cartel behaviour.90 
There are 12 divisions, nine specialized in branches, with three focused on cartel 
infringements (i.e. additionally, specialized assistance of the Special Unit for Combating 
Cartels “SKK” is afforded to the Litigation and Legal Division).91 Competition “leads” 
funnel into the BUND by other competition authorities, via DE’s anonymous platform or 
through formally filed leniency applications before they are allocated to the appropriate 
divisions; if it is a hard-core cartel case, it will be forwarded to three specialized divisions 
(i.e. Divisions 10, 11 and 12), otherwise it will be given to the Branch Division for a final 
decision on allocation.92  Once allocated to the most appropriate division, the BUND 
employs similar procedure to that of the EC at the investigatory, post-infringement 
finding and pre-trial stages.   
The BUND’s “key witness programme” (i.e. leniency program), enacted in 2000 
and revised in 2006, has proven to be extremely successful with “over half of all cartel 
proceedings [having been] triggered by information from leniency applicants”.93 The key 
witness program operates essentially the same as that of the EC and MLP providing full 
immunity to the first cartelist who contacts and admits its cartel participation in 
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conjunction with “continuous and unlimited cooperation” with the BUND.94 Reductions of 
administrative fines also follow the same EC/MLP regimen, whereby the BUND sets the 
conditions for predictable band reductions pursuant to the value of the evidentiary 
contributions made by the subsequent approaching cartelists.95  Because of increased 
investigatory measures, improved human resources and the advent of the leniency 
program, the BUND has been able to detect and combat more cartels with increased 
vigour and obtain higher overall fines/convictions equating to an increased deterrence of 
cartel infringement as seen in their prosecutorial statistics.96  
It is important to recognize that the BUND is “not a clearly administrative system, 
but not a real criminal system [either]…” as it has enacted “administrative offense 
proceedings” for use when pursuing cartel offenders, and it operates as a two-tiered 
system, whereby the investigation unit decides, based on the totality of evidence it 
collected, on whether there is a finding of infringement and the level of harm the cartel 
inflicted on the market.97 During the first stage of the proceeding, the BUND investigates 
the alleged infringing activities by initiating dawn raids and other investigative measures 
to uncover the pertinent evidence necessary to prove cartel culpability; then, from the 
evidence it collected, the investigating unit proceeds to make an infringement decision 
based on the weight and gravity of the evidence and drafts a SOO with its findings.98  It 
is at this point, the cartelist has the ability to comment on the merits of the SOO, 
including the fines proscribed; if after hearing the arguments of the cartelist the BUND is 
not convinced to depart from its SOO findings, then the case moves into the second 
stage where the prosecutor becomes involved and the SOO becomes the criminal 
indictment.99 In the second stage, the BUND becomes the prosecutor’s key witness and 
a full-fledged complex trial ensues with the burden of proof on the prosecutor; “here, it 
is not the infringement decision that is tested, it is that of the evidence”.100  
To ensure transparency and predictability at both stages of the proceedings, DE 
enacted its national legislation to ensure deference was paid towards: safeguarding a 
Defendant’s fundamental rights, enhancing the transparency of investigatory measures, 
and increasing the integrity of procedural protocol and sanctioning policy.101 The 
aforementioned safeguards will be touched upon later in the conclusion when 
developing recommendations for best practices regarding the interplay between 
Defendants’ fundamental rights and participation in the leniency program. 
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2. Irish Competition Authority 
Pursuant to IE’s designation as a EU Member State, and in alignment with Regulation 
No. 1/2003, the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (hereinafter, 
“CCPC”) employs as its legal basis the Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 
2014102 (in conjunction with the Competition Act of 2002103) in furtherance of prohibiting 
“activities which prevent, restrict or distort competition in trade” in the Irish market.104 
The Irish competition regime is quite different from that of the EC, as IE operates a fully 
criminalized system, but the central tenets of TFEU Article(s) 101 and 102 makeup the 
backbone of the Competition Act in force to combat cartels.105  The CCPC works in 
conjunction with the Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter, “DPP”) to prosecute 
hard-core cartel infringements, and in concurrence with the Competition Enforcement 
Division to handle cases outside the hard-core criminal realm.106 Whether the alleged 
anti-competitive case comes from another competition authority, an informant, or from 
the cartel immunity programme, every case will enter and be screened by the CCPC 
“Commission” before being allocated to the DPP or the internal Competition 
Enforcement Division.107 If the incoming case deals with a hard-core cartel activity, the 
Commission will recommend that the parties be prosecuted by the DPP in the IE Central 
Criminal Court on indictment; in instances where the Commission believes the cartel 
infringement does not rise to the level of an indictable offense, then it will bring criminal 
proceedings against the cartel participants in the IE District Court as a summary 
prosecution (i.e. trial without a jury); when the Commission discerns that the activity 
has anti-competitive effects but is not an operable cartel, then it will be given to the civil 
competition enforcement division to initiate proceedings in the IE High Court to compel 
parties to stop their illegal activity.108 All the aforementioned branches work in 
collaboration to ensure proper competitive functioning in the IE market, with the CCPC 
exercising its discretion when reviewing potential criminal allegations and determining to 
what extent the CCPC will intervene to correct the infringing behaviour.  
The CCPC’s “cartel immunity programme” (i.e. leniency programme) was recently 
revised in January 2015 to enhance the transparency of the collaborative policy, 
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between the DPP and the Commission, which proscribes the authority for the DPP to 
grant immunity from criminal prosecution.109 It must be noted that the DPP is the sole 
entity that grants immunity from prosecution; not the Commission or its respective 
branches.110 The IE cartel immunity programme reflects the ECN model leniency 
program to the extent that it “encourages self-reporting of unlawful cartels by cartel 
participants at the earliest possible stage in return for immunity from prosecution”.111 
The Commission acts as the initial intermediary between immunity applicants and the 
DPP, as the Commission is the body that conducts the cartel investigation for the DPP 
and interacts with the applicants to determine if they fulfilled all their expectations and 
provided full cooperation throughout the preliminary stages; if the applicant provides the 
necessary information and evidence to secure a guilty verdict, then the Commission will 
recommend to the DPP to forego prosecuting said applicant.112 The IE cartel immunity 
programme does not provide for settlements or band reductions for cartelists that do 
not meet the requirements of full immunity.113 
As highlighted above, the IE competition regime is fully criminalized such that 
both undertakings and individuals can be prosecuted under Part 2, Art. 4 of the IE 
Competition Act 2002, where a separate decision-making body (i.e. the IE court system) 
determines criminal culpability; subsequent provisional amendments of said Act in 
relevance to penalties (e.g. fines and incarceration) have become more significant to 
exploit the salient deterrent effect heightened sanctioning can have against infringers 
and society as a whole.114 Because the criminal sanctions imposed could expose the 
accused to high fines and jail time, IE recognized and employed more stringent protocol 
to safeguard Defendants’ rights in both the investigatory and procedural aspects of their 
competition proceedings, as said protection of rights are paramount to the adherence of 
laws protecting human rights, and for fair, predictable and transparent procedural 
processes.115 The aforementioned IE protocol employed to safeguard Defendants’ 
fundamental rights will be discussed and critically analysed in more detail in Chapter 
Five when comparing IE’s procedural legislation with that of LV in relation search 
warrants and investigatory protocol. 
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3. Latvian Competition Authority 
Similar to both DE and IE, because LV is an EU Member State, the Saeima (i.e. the 
Parliament of the Republic of Latvia), in conjunction with its NCA, the “Konkurences 
Padome” (hereinafter, “KP”), has enacted a document entitled “Competition Law ” as its 
national legislation pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003, “to protect, maintain and develop 
free, fair and equal competition in the interests of the public in all economic sectors…”; 
this legislation has undergone six amendments since its inception in 2002.116 Whether a 
potential anti-competitive case is introduced to the KP via another 
institution/municipality or through a leniency application, the case is reviewed by a case 
handler and an internal decision is made regarding whether the KP will intervene and 
initiate an investigation into the alleged infringing activities.117 If it is believed by the KP 
that the alleged activities warrant an investigation, then it proceeds with executing a 
dawn raid or other investigatory measure to uncover the evidence necessary to discern 
culpability of cartel behaviour.118  After its investigation, the KP will create a procedural 
action report laying out all the details and formalities that it followed when conducting 
the investigation; this report will highlight the “venue and date of occurrence”, the legal 
basis for the investigation, the time when the investigation was “initiated and 
completed”, the position/name of the person(s) conducting the investigation and 
compiling the report, the “state of progress of the action [with its] established facts” and 
the “property and documents obtained during the procedural action”.119 Once a decision 
is made by the investigative unit as to the level of the cartelist’s culpability and the fines 
that should be imposed, the investigative unit will draft a SOO and provide it to the 
cartelists at the conclusion of the investigation.  If the company disagrees with the 
findings of the KP, and it cannot informally sway the KP towards a more favourable 
position, then it can appeal the case to the Higher Court of Latvia.120 
In an effort to decrease secret cartel agreements and increase the efficiency in 
which it uncovers such competition infringement, the KP enacted a leniency program 
that closely mirrors that of the ECN’s MLP providing “an opportunity for an undertaking 
that is or was involved in a cartel to be the first one to submit evidence on a voluntary 
basis…and to receive a full exemption from a fine and an exemption from the prohibition 
to participate in public procurement”.121 There are opportunities for undertakings that do 
not qualify for full immunity to obtain predictable reductions in sanctions as defined in 
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Cabinet Regulation 796, which provides guidance on the determination of fines for 
specific violations of Competition Law.122 At the time of the Author’s original research, 
the KP did not memorialize the details of its leniency programme as provisions or articles 
in its Competition Law (now it can be found in Chapter III Article 121), but did highlight 
the importance of the leniency programme on its website, calling attention to the fact 
that horizontal agreements are severe violations of LV Competition Law and that the 
maximum penalty equating to 10% of company turnover from the preceding financial 
year (and exclusion from public procurement) could be imposed for such violative 
activities.123  
The success of the LV leniency program to date has not been adequately tested, 
as it was revealed by both the 2014 KP Annual Report124 and KP executives/investigative 
staff that the leniency program has been underutilized, whereby “there has only been 
two cases of immunity [that] have been granted under the leniency program… [where] 
all the essential information required to begin an investigation was provided by the 
leniency applicant”.125 Both KP staff and legal practitioners believe that some of the 
reasons for said underutilization of the leniency programme are due to the public’s 
overall ignorance of LV’s leniency program, their failure to understand the 
responsibilities and importance of the KP with respect to protection of the LV market, 
their inability to identify that collusive practices are harmful to general consumers, the 
pervasive cultural mind set towards condemning whistle blowing, and their inability to 
see that anti-competitive agreements are violative/criminal offenses.126  LV does not 
stand alone on said issues, as it was revealed to the author during multiple interviews 
with NCAs from other prior-communist nations, that it is common for said communities 
to have the mentality that price fixing and anti-competitive agreements are not wrong, 
but rather just part of doing business in a small market, where everyone knows each 
other, and where restricted pricing agreements are created in the normal course of 
business.127  It was also highlighted during an interview with the Lithuanian NCA that 
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the challenge with underutilization might be due to a lack of trust regarding 
predictability that is built into the general community, as potential applicants do not 
know with a sufficient degree of certainty, that once they come forward with news of 
cartel behaviour, that the NCA will properly respond and deal with the violative 
allegations in a sufficient, protective and proactive manner.128 Even though the 
aforementioned challenges remain steadfast as issues faced by the KP (and other 
regional NCAs), the KP is hopeful that as market participants gain a higher level of 
knowledge/education regarding the benefits of competition, and an appreciation of the 
purpose behind LV’s leniency program, there will be more applicants and utilization of 
said programme in the future.  
As denoted above, the KP is a purely administrative two-tiered system, with its 
investigative unit both collecting evidence to expose cartel culpability concurrently with 
making decisions on said evidence to impose fines/sanctions on anti-competitive 
undertakings.129 Because the author uncovered potential areas of violative protocol 
regarding the failure to safeguard Defendants’ fundamental rights, the author will delve 
deeper into specific areas of LV’s Competition law in Chapter Five, by comparing LV’s 
laws with those of the IE NCA and the EC for insight into potential areas of necessary 
change, including targeted recommendations to follow. 
d. The US Regime:  A Comparative Stance 
US Antitrust policy is derived from three major Federal antitrust laws, including the 
Sherman Antitrust Act130, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act; the 
Sherman Act has been viable precedent since 1890 and criminalizes “every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”.131 
                                           
128 D. Lurje, Head of Cartel Investigations for the Lithuania Competition Authority, “In-person 
interview regarding the Lithuanian Leniency Program, Informants and Settlements”, interview 
conducted on 17 August 2015.  
129 See Supra note 117. 
130 The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), “Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty”, 15 U.S. 
Code §1, available on: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1. 
131 United States Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer”, Antitrust 
Pamphlet, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/03/06/antitrust-enfor-consumer.pdf, 
and see Supra note 130. It must be noted that there are two entities in the US that focus on 
violations of competition in the US market; one is the USDOJ-ATD and the other is the FTC-
Bureau of Competition. The focus of this paper will be on the responsibilities and actions of the 
USDOJ-ATD as the author will focus on the criminalized prosecution of antitrust infringements 
and the US amnesty regime; the FTC focuses on anti-competitive practices in interstate 
commerce, and even though the FTC has a criminal liaison unit with the USDOJ, it will not be 
discussed at any length in this article.  Moreover, only the Sherman Act will be discussed in this 
article as it is the federal act promulgated to criminalize violations of antitrust law; the Clayton 
Act is a civil statute and the FTC Act is a federal interstate commerce act (both of which carry no 
criminal penalties), and as such, will not be explored in this subsection. 
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The USDOJ-Antitrust Division (hereinafter, “ATD”) is the only governmental entity, 
pursuant to US federal law, empowered to prosecute criminal violations of the Sherman 
Act in US District Courts; investigations for the ATD are conducted by external US 
governmental agencies in collaboration with the ATD.132 In 1978, the ATD introduced its 
first Corporate Leniency Program, which was subsequently revised in 1993 to increase 
the level of transparency, predictability and incentives that the former program lacked; 
the current US models of amnesty/leniency “demonstrate the importance [,] for any 
successful leniency regime [,] of ‘certainty of outcome’ for the applicant”.133 The 
amnesty policy of the US is quite different from that of the EC, as it invokes separate 
corporate and individual amnesty policies to aide in the criminal prosecution of both 
corporations and individuals in US federal courts.134 The three most significant policy 
departures of the 1993 Corporate Leniency Program (as distinguished from the initial 
1978 version) are that (1) it provides corporations automatic immunity from prosecution 
upon adherence to strict requirements, (2) it offers an alternative amnesty for 
corporations providing information after the start of an investigation, and (3) it offers 
full amnesty for the directors/employees of corporate applicants that come forward and 
admit their involvement in a corporate statement.135 The Corporate Leniency Program is 
touted as being a “case generator” and the “single most effective investigatory tool” in 
the ATD’s arsenal, as it has aided in the discovery and successful prosecution of vast 
numbers of international cartelists harming American consumers.136  In 1994, the ATD 
launched its Individual Leniency Program, which applies to “all individuals who approach 
the Division on their own behalf, not as a part of the corporate proffer or confession, to 
seek leniency for reporting illegal antitrust activity of which the Division has not 
previously been made aware”.137 Both the Corporate and Individual Leniency Policies 
together make up the US leniency regime, of which the elements and structure of the 
Corporate Leniency Policy will be discussed in further detail to illustrate the ATD’s 
commitment towards detecting and deterring cartel activity in the US market.  
                                           
132 See Supra note 131. 
133 M. O’Kane, “The Law of Criminal Cartels – Practice and Procedure” (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2009), p. 12. 
134 Ibid, p. 201.  
135 G. Spratling, “The Corporate Leniency Policy:  Answers to Recurring Questions”, ABA Antitrust 
Section Presentation, 1998 Spring Meeting, presented on 1 April 1998, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/corporate-leniency-policy-answers-recurring-questions, and 
US Department of Justice, “Corporate Leniency Policy”, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0091.pdf. 
136 S. Hammond, “Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s 
Criminal Enforcement Program”, ABA Section of Antitrust Law Presentation, 56th Annual Spring 
Meeting, presented on 26 March 2008, available on: http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/recent-
developments-trends-and-milestones-antitrust-divisions-criminal-enforcement, and See Supra 
note 133, p. 202.  
137 US Department of Justice, “Leniency Policy for Individuals”, available on: 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0092.pdf.  
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To receive full immunity (by reporting infringing activity prior to the ATD 
conducting an investigation), the corporate applicants must: (1) provide 
information/evidence that has not already been reported to the ATD from an alternative 
source, (2) take “prompt and effective action [to divulge] and terminate its part in the 
activity”, (3) report the “wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provide full, 
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation”, (4) 
provide a corporate wide confession; not individual confessions of directors/employees, 
(5) make restitution to injured parties (if possible) and (6) not to have been the 
ringleader of said illegal corporate conduct or to have coerced another party to 
participate in said illegal activity.138  If any of the above elements are not met, the 
undertaking can still apply for immunity, whether before or after the ATD conducts an 
investigation, if:  (1) the corporation is the first to come forward, (2) the ATD does not 
have the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction, (3) the company took “prompt and 
effective action to terminate its part in the activity”, (4) the report was made with 
“candor and complete cooperation”, (5) the confession is a “truly corporate act”, (6) the 
undertaking makes restitution (where possible), and (6) the granting of leniency would 
not be unfair to others.139  It must be noted that timing becomes critically important 
after an investigation ensues, as participants are put on notice that their behaviour has 
been detected by the ATD, and it is very likely that other cartel participants will be 
frantically seeking immunity from prosecution as the 1st applicant; especially since the 
penalties in the US for cartel behaviour are extremely stringent and individuals can be 
criminally [personally] prosecuted for their participatory acts.140  
One of the salient differences between the US leniency regime, and that of other 
nations, is the seriousness to which US federal law attaches penalties to cartel offenses, 
which undoubtingly infiltrates both the operational scope and incentive structure of its 
leniency regime.141 Sanctions can have a huge bearing on whether companies will come 
forward and self-report; making one of the other unique differences of the US leniency 
regime that US federal law carves out potential personal legal exposure and 
imprisonment for directors engaging in cartel conduct, demonstrating an inherent trend 
of “enhanced individual liability, greater numbers of individuals prosecuted, longer 
periods of incarceration, and greater frequency of imprisonment”.142 The ATD has 
proclaimed that “if the threat of incarceration is the greatest deterrent of criminal 
conduct”, then the promise of immunity from criminal prosecution and no prison time is 
a “game changer” that becomes the impetus behind taking advantage of the leniency 
program, for individual directors to avoid going to jail and for companies to completely 
circumvent criminal prosecution, convictions and fines.143 
                                           
138 See Supra note 133, pp. 202-203. 
139 Ibid, p. 203. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Supra note 40. 
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid.  
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For companies that do not meet the criteria of full immunity, the ATD provides 
predictable reductions of imposable fines, but provides no insight as to how it will 
affirmatively address how “subsequent” co-operators will be treated, making it even 
more imperative to be the first reporting cartelist.144 Due to the US Sentencing 
Guidelines being highly detailed and incredibly structured, it allows for defence counsel 
to openly discuss with their client’s case options and strategy, and to negotiate plea 
agreements with the Government regarding ATD’s transparent discounts for cooperation 
(e.g. samples of the Model Annotated Corporate Plea Agreements are online for 
Defendants’ perusal).145 The mentality behind the transparency of online plea 
agreements is to simplify the facilitation of discussion between the Defendant and 
defence counsel as it is believed that increased transparency of procedure will enhance 
the predictability and reliability Defendant’s will have with the US competition regime, 
ultimately making more efficacious the leniency program and participants use of said 
program. Moreover, there are no band discounts offered, like in the EC regime, but the 
US system provides for a base fine of 20% of the volume of US commerce affected by 
the cartel, multiplied by minimum/maximum multipliers corresponding with the 
Defendant’s culpability score, with the maximum fine not equating to double the 
minimum fine; only on the Government’s motion (and the Court’s acceptance of said 
motion) can a company receive a downward departure below the minimum fine for 
significant cooperation in advance of the instituted investigation.146 The 
minimum/maximum multipliers include: number of employees, involvement in or 
tolerance of cartel behaviour, criminal history (i.e. offender score), obstruction of justice 
(i.e. failure to comply with requests of investigators; destroying evidence, dishonest 
testimony) and acceptance of responsibility. One must also note the hybrid nature of the 
prosecutor’s ability to follow the structured Sentencing Guidelines concurrently with 
imposing his/her own subjective views of cooperation for a downward departure of 
fines.  
As was highlighted in the initial section of this chapter, the ATD believes there 
are three hallmarks behind a successful amnesty program for which it recommends for 
enhanced “detecting and cracking cartel activity”, including; (1) the “threat of stiff 
sanctions for those who participate in hard-core cartel activity”, (2) a “cultivation of a 
law enforcement environment in which business executives perceive a significant risk of 
detection by antitrust authorities”, and (3) there must be “transparency, to the greatest 
extent possible, throughout the anti-cartel enforcement program so that prospective 
cooperating parties can predict with a high degree of certainty their treatment following 
cooperation”.147  The author will explore the aforementioned three hallmarks in greater 
                                           
144 Ibid. 
145 US Department of Justice “Model Annotated Corporate Plea Agreement”, available on: 
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146 See Supra note 40.   
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Cartel Activity”, available on: http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518526/download.  
 41 
 
depth in the conclusion, to emphasize the necessary elements at the intersection of 
leniency programs and Defendants’ fundamental rights, to secure a greater legal 
deterrent effect and enhanced participation of leniency programs for increased overall 
competition in the market. 
e. Concluding Remarks:  A Comparative Approach to 
Leniency 
When looking at the above jurisdictional differences through a comparative lens, one 
can see that the type of competition regime (i.e. bifurcated vs. two-tiered and/or purely 
criminalized vs. administrative or both), in conjunction with the approach to leniency 
program structure, will have an impact on the transparency and predictability for which 
leniency applicants will be treated, how investigatory measures will ensue and be carried 
out, and how decisions on infringement will be taken in relevance to cartel infringement. 
Said differences may play in favour of or against safeguarding a Defendant’s rights, 
which in many respects can undermine the efficacy of the leniency program and cartel 
destabilization as a whole. As posited above, the author will now look at the purpose 
behind specific procedural fundamental rights and point to distinct challenges 
appurtenant to different competition regimes/leniency structures, which if improved, 
may lead to attainment of increased competition in the market.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  DEFENDANT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS 
a. The Link between Leniency and a Defendant’s 
Fundamental Rights 
From the very nature of how the leniency program operates, one can see an 
unequivocal link between the severity of sanctions, the incentives of the leniency 
program, and the necessity of safeguarding a Defendant’s fundamental rights for the 
system structure to uphold the principles conferred on the EC/NCAs by the TFEU 
through Regulation No. 1/2003. In this Chapter, the author is going to dissect and delve 
deeper into competition sanctioning, the legal authority granting fundamental rights to 
Defendants, what rights are afforded in competition proceedings and at what stages 
they attach, and what are the ramifications for legal authority that is violated when 
Defendants’ rights are not upheld.    
If successfully implemented, the leniency program at its most basic level, 
provides the menagerie of incentives necessary to “induce disclosure” of covert anti-
competitive behaviour in the marketplace by and through full immunity from severe 
sanctioning; said sanctioning should be a balance between “a nature and level that 
lead[s] to the most efficient prevention and deterrent effects”.148  As highlighted above, 
sanctioning is stridently different between jurisdictions in the EU and in other global 
markets, such that discerning the necessary severity level of sanctioning, pursuant to 
individual market standards, is a current hot topic of debate. The US has become a 
prominent enforcer with its success in prosecuting antitrust cases that affects American 
commerce, because it treats hard-core antitrust violations as criminal offenses 
prosecuting both undertakings and individuals, concurrently with laying the 
Constitutional foundation necessary to impose both severe fines (in terms of 
corporations) and fines/imprisonment (in terms of individual directors/employees 
involved in the violative scheme).149 It has been suggested by the USDOJ-ATD that 
jurisdictions that do not impose criminal sanctions and individual criminal liability “will 
never be as effective at inducing leniency applications…this is due to individuals seeking 
the greatest incentive to disclose a collusive practice when they are threatened in ways 
that are not reimbursable by their undertakings”.150 However, with the EC operating a 
purely administrative regime (i.e. only imposing fines for violative cartel behaviour), the 
focus will now transition towards the severity of fining, the balancing act between the 
                                           
148 P. Botana, “Prevention and Deterrence of Collusive Behavior:  The Role of Leniency Programs” 
(Winter 2006/2007), Columbia Journal of European Law, p. 49.  
149 Ibid. 
150 R. Hewitt Pate, “International Anti-Cartel Enforcement”, Presentation before the ICN Cartels 
Workshop 12-13, presented on 21 November 2004, available on:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206428.pdf, as found in Ibid. 
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length and gravity of the offense (i.e. proportionality), the point at which said fines 
surpass the threshold necessary to entice cartelists to exploit the leniency program, and 
when sanctions are severe enough to be considered criminal such that Defendants’ 
rights attach to the appurtenant competition proceedings.  
The ability of an administrative fine to rise to the adequate level of severity to 
induce leniency program participation, in the absence of individual culpability, is a 
complex question; one where a multi-faceted approach must be employed for a targeted 
analysis of the quantification of harm to attain the goals of sufficient fining. The legal 
authority for the EC to impose fines (pursuant to Articles 101 and 102) is derived from 
Articles 23(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003, which lays out the elements that must be met 
concurrently with the maximum fine that “shall not exceed 10% of the sum of the total 
turnover of each member active on the market affected by the infringement of the 
association”.151 This along with Article 23(3) of Regulation no. 1/2003, providing that the 
amount of fine imposed must “[illustrate] regard…both to the gravity and to the 
duration of the infringement”; including Article 5(4) of the TFEU, which states “under 
the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”, and Article 49(3) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, “CFREU”), which 
posits “the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense”, 
makeup the legal context behind EU fining policy.152 When analysing the proportionality 
of the fining structure to determine how severe a fine can be without crossing the 
threshold of becoming unreasonable, one must look at how “proportionality” is defined, 
regarding if fines should follow a more “retributive” view of punishment as mandated by 
the Charter and Article 23(3) of Regulation No. 1/2003 (i.e. fines determined by 
assessing the gravity/duration of the infringement and that they are not 
disproportionate to the same), or a more relative/pragmatic view (whereby fines will be 
set where deterrence can be “achieved at the lowest cost”), as there is no clear cut 
methodological doctrine/case law targeting competition infringements.153 In tandem with 
what the USDOJ posited regarding the structure of sufficient punitive sanctioning, 
settled EU case law provides that fines are not set at a level to merely counteract “illegal 
profits[,] but also aim to punish past conduct…[and] prevent such conduct from being 
repeated in the future”154, as fining an amount that could be covered by “cartel gains” 
would not equate to a sufficient enough deterrent to effectuate use of the leniency 
program or affect directors’ behaviour regarding cartel infringement. Moreover, as held 
                                           
151 See Supra note 63, Article 23(2). 
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Chamber) [2014], paragraph(s) 379 and 390, available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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in the Archer Daniels Midland case, if a “fine were set at a level that merely negated the 
profits [benefit] of a cartel, it would not be a deterrent…[as] insufficient account would 
be taken of the fact that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement of Article 
81(1) EC”.155 It is logical to presume that when corporations “make financial calculations 
and management decisions, undertakings take [into] account rationally not only the 
level of fines that they risk incurring in the event of an infringement[,] but also the 
likelihood of the cartel being detected”.156 Thus, it is apparent that firms look at a 
number of financial data points when discerning whether to continue cartel behaviour 
due to the penalty not being severe enough to make it unprofitable to violate 
competition law (i.e. the fine does not affect the bottom line enough to validate stopping 
cartel infringement), or take advantage of the leniency program to circumvent severe 
fines, better handle massive civil damages claims and negative press affecting future 
corporate value, and avoid the ultimate risk of approaching corporate insolvency. 
Therefore, the issue always comes back to if the EC were to gradually increase fine 
levels, so as to more effectively penalize competition infringements proportionate to the 
objective of achieving sufficient deterrence (i.e. to punish infringers to curtail recidivist 
behaviour and to demonstrate the severity of cartel infringements to the public to 
prevent future violative behaviour), what safeguards need to be put into place for the 
more severe fines to be upheld as not traipsing on the procedural rights of Defendants. 
Even more specifically, when does the purported increase in fines meet or exceed the 
level considered to be “criminal” such that Defendants’ fundamental rights attach to the 
competition proceedings. And in turn, how does deference paid towards procedural 
safeguards equate to increased participation in the leniency program and an overall 
decrease in cartel behaviour.  
b. The Law on Defendant’s Fundamental Rights 
 “Rights of defence must be respected in all proceedings in which sanctions may 
be imposed, a reminder of particular importance in the context of ever-increasing 
fines and other grave consequences attached to cartel decisions”.157 
i. A Closer Look at the ECHR and ECtHR 
As the severity of sanctioning increases, so does the “concern regarding the fairness and 
stability of the procedures used by the EC to achieve such penalties”.158  As a general 
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rule, when fines rise to levels analogous to sanctions imposed on criminal behaviour, the 
jurisdiction must implement a more heightened and rigorous procedural regimen to 
ensure fundamental rights and due process are upheld in such a competition regime.159 
Without more stringent practices in place, there will undoubtingly be issues of 
“effectiveness and fairness” that transpire undermining overall efficaciousness of the 
regime and participation in the leniency program.160 In response to said implications, the 
EC-Directorate General for Competition (hereinafter, “DG”) has taken significant strides 
to “render its processes more transparent and subject to more internal scrutiny” (e.g. 
the DG published a best practices guideline for antitrust proceedings/hearing officer 
procedures161 and an explanatory note regarding inspection authorization for DG 
decisions162). Perhaps the most impactful debate regarding fairness in competition 
proceedings is the increasing stigmatization towards DG’s practices operating in 
derogation of a Defendant’s human rights. Once the Treaty on European Union (i.e. 
Treaty of Lisbon) entered into force on December 1, 2009163, it triggered the 
commitment towards the EU becoming a contracting party with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, “ECHR”).164 The ECHR is an international 
treaty that “enshrines basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of everyone within 
the jurisdiction of any MS…[including] the right to life…to freedom and safety, to a fair 
trial, [and] to respect…private and family life...”; the European Court of Human Rights is 
the counterpart to the ECHR as it renders obligatory judgments on alleged human rights 
violations of the Convention, and will be able to scrutinize all EC actions in light of 
deference paid towards Defendants’ human rights if the EU accedes to the ECHR.165 It 
must be noted that the current status of the applicability of the ECHR to the EU is still 
nonbinding (i.e. to the EU and its institutions; not to MSs), but Article 6(3) of the Treaty 
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on EU “refers to the ECHR as part of the general principles of Community law”.166 
However, the ECJ held in its 2/13 Opinion that “the agreement on the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR is not compatible with Article 6(2) [of the] TEU or with Protocol (No. 8) 
relating to Article 6(2) of the TEU on the accession of the Union to the ECHR”; said 
opinion set out four reasons behind its holding and has effectively stopped all 
progression on the accession.167 Even though there is no current forward movement, the 
potential impact of the accession could be quite significant as it would arguably (1) 
“further strengthen the protection of human rights [through] independent external 
control”, (2) create a “coherent system of fundamental rights protection across Europe”, 
(3) subject all EU legal systems “to the same supervision in relation to protection of 
human rights” and (4) would allow the EU to be a party to proceedings before the 
ECtHR; the final coagulative outcome would designate the ECJ as the final authority on 
the interpretation and enforcement of EU law, and the ECtHR as the final arbiter on the 
ECHR, with the ECtHR being a “specialised human rights court exercising external 
control over the international law obligations of the Union resulting from the 
accession”.168 Even with all the current challenges related to the ECHR, there has been 
heightened awareness and scrutiny of potential human rights violations pursuant to EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, but this will notably intensify if the shift is made towards 
accession. These developments are important to recognize as they will provide 
accessible venues of “potential recourse for individuals and companies” and will make 
more expansive external scrutiny of DG actions.169 This could also dampen the 
effectiveness of the leniency program as the Defendant could simply point to the human 
rights violations as a way to circumvent sanctioning and culpability, develop an 
increased mistrust for competition case handling due to the inept level of transparency, 
or not take the program seriously due to the DG’s inability to effectively achieve 
predictable results in light of the procedural insecurities. As stated above, because the 
DG has the wide pervasive discretion and expansive authority over every aspect of the 
competition proceeding (i.e. the EC power encompasses the role(s) of “law-maker, 
policeman, investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury”), with a very limited function played 
by the EU courts, it breeds many potential fundamental human rights challenges.170 The 
author will now explore where fundamental human rights/safeguards are derived from 
and how they attach to EU competition proceedings. 
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ii. When and how do Defendant’s Rights Attach to Competition 
Proceedings  
When looking at a competition regime’s structural/procedural composition and 
enforcement regimen, the general position of human rights in relevance to competition 
law infringement begins with Recital 37 of Regulation No. 1/2003, which provides, “this 
regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized in 
particular by the CFREU. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied 
with respect to those rights and principles”.171 Moreover, Article 52(3) of the CFREU 
holds where it “contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR [at a 
minimum]…the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down 
by the said Convention”.172 In the case of Archer Daniels Midland, the Court held “it 
should be recalled that in all proceedings in which sanctions…may be imposed, 
observance of the rights of defence is a fundamental principle of Community law which 
must be complied with even if the proceedings in question are administrative 
proceedings”.173 Shifting over to the ECtHR, it held that the contents of both Article Six 
(i.e. Right to Fair Trial/Right to Presumption of Innocence) and Article Eight (i.e. Right to 
Respect for Private and Family Life) is relevant to both natural and legal persons (i.e. 
undertakings), which makes it directly applicable to the protocol employed by the DG to 
carry out its inspections during dawn raids or in suspicion of violative anti-competitive 
behaviour.174 Thus, it can be extrapolated that one of the motives behind the application 
of the aforementioned law, to competition proceedings, is to afford rights to Defendants 
to increase the procedural safeguards necessary to lawfully impose stricter sanctioning, 
to uphold DG’s current competition regime, and to increase the overall viability of the 
leniency program. To reflect back on the foundational context germane to the current 
issue, the DG procedural debate stems from whether the DG has (1) the authority to 
carry out a full investigation of alleged cartel behaviour, then (2) impartially decide on 
the finding of an infringement based on the evidence it uncovered, and subsequently (3) 
impose fines in an unbiased manner, concurrently with being compatible with the “EU 
principle[s] for effective judicial protection”.175 The bone of contention comes from 
whether or not the current DG regime meets the essence of ‘constitutionality’ set forth 
in the aforementioned legal authority by properly affording Defendants the protection of 
guaranteed fundamental rights in competition cases that rise to the level of being 
considered “criminal’ because of the potential severity of sanctions imposed for findings 
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of cartel infringement. The significance of finding “criminality” is important for the 
attachment of fundamental rights in administrative proceedings pursuant to Art 6 of the 
ECHR, and predictably, the ECtHR in its Engel holding, proscribed a very broad 
interpretation of the meaning of “criminal” in relevance to said Article.176 In Engel, the 
Court established three criteria for determining whether proceedings are criminal, 
including (1) the domestic classification of criminality under national law, (2) the nature 
of the offense, and (3) the “severity of the potential penalty which the person concerned 
risks incurring”.177 Delving deeper, the domestic classification element is “of relative 
weight and serves only as a [mere] starting point”; where the domestic law considers 
the offense criminal, then this finding is dispositive, but where the domestic law does 
not deem the offense criminal, the Court will use this only as a starting point in their 
analysis.178 More deference is paid to the second criterion, in that the “nature of the 
offense” accounts for: the binding character of the offense, if the proceedings are 
instituted by a public body, or if there is a “punitive or deterrent element to the process” 
(among many other factors), but none of these items are entirely decisive.179  The third 
criterion can be dispositive especially where there is the potential for significant financial 
penalties or imprisonment; irrespective, “it is the potential penalty, rather than the 
actual penalty imposed, which is decisive”.180  To develop a more thorough 
understanding of the above criteria, one can view the analysis in the context of the 
Ozturk case, where the Court held that an administrative minor driving offense can be 
deemed criminal because the underlying “rule of law [was] directed towards all road 
users proscribing certain conduct and imposing a sanction for its breach...the penalty 
was intended to be punitive and deterrent in its effect”; here, the purpose of the penalty 
was enough to define the offense as criminal, whereby the nominal nature of the fine 
did not sway the Court away from finding favourable Art. 6 application.181 It has been 
posited that when looking at subsequent holdings that employ the Engel criteria, one 
can see that the Court is applying a more expansive definition as to what it deems 
criminal allowing for the attachment of Art. 6 criminal safeguards in administrative 
proceedings.182 However, the question still remains whether the EU competition 
proceedings meet the Engel criteria for favourable Article 6 treatment, especially since 
Article 23(5) of Regulation No. 1/2003 overtly provides that affirmative findings of 
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competition infringement that impose fines “shall not be of a criminal law nature”.183 
Here, one can point back to ‘criteria one’ of Engel, which provides that the domestic 
classification of the offense is not dispositive, but merely a starting point of inquiry, and 
allow for the Court to employ a more expansive analysis including: the severity of the 
fines imposed, the objective the fine is tasked to accomplish, the expectation of overall 
recidivist deterrence (accounting for public condemnation), and the elements of 
proportionality (i.e. gravity/duration of offense) accounted for in competition 
sanctioning.  From this vantage point, it can be extrapolated that cartel infringements 
are to be considered criminal in nature and must be afforded procedural safeguards 
pursuant to Article 6 of the ECHR.184  In summary, pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of the 
ECHR (through the application of CFREU Article 52(3) allowing for the contents of its 
Articles 47 and 48 to mirror that of the ECHR), Defendants are afforded the right to a 
fair trial, right to the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy in competition 
proceedings.  
Now that it is established how criminal procedural safeguards attach to 
competition proceedings, the author will traverse through the distinct fundamental rights 
that attach to competition proceedings at the investigative stage. It must be made clear 
at the outset that Defendants’ fundamental rights attach to every stage of the 
proceeding, but the author will now narrow the focus of the article to only rights that 
attach during the preliminary-investigative stage. The reasons for this are two-fold; the 
first is so the author can delve deeper into the respective rights specifically attached to 
investigatory procedure, and second so that the author can extend the analysis past DG 
procedure (i.e. EC-focused procedure) and provide a more concrete example of 
safeguarding a Defendant’s rights in the jurisdiction of Latvia by and through 
comparative methodology in relevance to search warrants. This will provide readers with 
the opportunity to apply the aforesaid knowledge to the competition regime of an NCA; 
shedding light on both the legal and procedural differences that can lead to the 
safeguarding or undermining of a Defendant’s rights in NCA competition proceedings 
and the overall goals of the leniency program in a selected MS. 
iii. Defendant’s Fundamental Rights: Investigatory Stage 
“The Commission has wide powers of investigation…but, precisely because of 
that nature and because one and the same body is invested with the power to 
conduct investigations and…to take decision, the rights of defence of those 
subject to the procedure must be recognized without reservation and 
respected”.185 
As noted above, due to the secretive nature of cartel behaviour and the intensity for 
which the undertakings will try to cover up evidence of wrongdoing, the DG relies 
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heavily on documented evidence including both pre-existing documentation and 
retrospective oral and written testimony from directors and employees of the 
undertaking.186 But with the scope of allowance expanding to issues that touch upon the 
fundamental rights of Defendants, the goal of strengthening procedural safeguards to 
ensure due process becomes paramount to the maintenance and further development of 
the EU competition regime and a more efficacious leniency program. Pursuant to Article 
20 of Regulation 1/2003, the DG is allowed to perform surprise inspections (ie. dawn 
raids), without providing prior notice to the undertaking under investigation, as basic 
common sense would underscore that without this right the DG would be unable to 
successfully uncover the necessary evidence for a finding of infringement due to the 
predictable destruction and tampering with evidence.187 In addition, pursuant to Articles 
18-21 of Regulation No. 1/2003, the DG possesses the right to make requests for 
information (i.e. Article 18), the power to take statements (i.e. Article 19), the authority 
to conduct inspections of undertakings’ premises (i.e. Article 20), and the ability to 
conduct inspections of other premises, like that of private homes (i.e. Article 21).188 
When delving even deeper into Article 20(2), the Commission is empowered to: (a) 
“enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and associations of 
undertakings”, (b) “examine the books or other records related to the business, 
irrespective of the medium for which they are stored”, (c) “take or obtain in any form 
copies of or extracts from such books or records”, (d) “seal any business premises and 
books or records for the period…[of] the inspection”, and (e) “ask any representative or 
member of staff…for explanations on facts or documents relating to…the purpose of the 
inspection…”.189 But with said expansive rights analogous to those that attach to criminal 
investigations, comes a heightened responsibility to safeguard Defendants’ rights to 
ensure adequate predictability and transparency of procedural protocol to protect the 
viability of the infringement finding. With this said, the rights of defence are applicable 
to every stage of the investigative proceeding (e.g. preliminary investigative stage and 
the adversarial SOO stage), however the types of rights that attach are different with 
respect to each phase of the proceeding.  The rights that are considered to be the most 
relevant to the preliminary investigatory stage, which will be discussed below, are the 
right against self-incrimination, the privilege to engage in lawyer-client communications, 
the right to legal assistance and the right to be informed of the subject matter and 
purpose of the investigation; the author has previously addressed the Defendant’s right 
to fair trial, right to the presumption of innocence and right to privacy in subsection two 
of this Chapter.190  
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1. Right against Self-Incrimination 
One must take into account that due to the severity of the fines/sanctions that can be 
imposed in cartel infringement cases, which can directly stem from inquiries during said 
investigations, “undertaking[s]…cannot be expected to volunteer information which will 
be used against them”.191 The right against self-incrimination (i.e. the right to remain 
silent) allows for the accused to refuse supplying information that would directly prove 
culpability of an infringing or violative act.192 An undertaking can invoke its right against 
self-incrimination, only in circumstances where the DG is actually compelling information 
from said undertaking, which becomes critical when the DG is asking for information by 
request under a binding decision and when the DG elicits questions during on-site 
inspections.193 Said right is memorialized in Recital 23 of the Preamble to Regulation No. 
1/2003, which provides the DG “should be empowered…to require such information to 
be supplied as necessary to detect any agreement, decision or concerted practice 
prohibited by Art. 81. When complying…undertakings cannot be forced to admit that 
they have committed an infringement, but they are…obliged to answer factual questions 
and to provide documents, even if this information may be used to establish against 
them…the existence of an infringement”.194 Moreover, in the Orkem case, the ECJ held 
that the DG “may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might 
involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement [,] which it is 
incumbent on the Commission to prove”.195 Thus, the prior rule of law safeguards 
against undertakings from being forced to elicit statements that would prove full 
culpability of cartel infringements, but it does not provide the right for the undertaking 
to remain completely silent as that “would go beyond what would be necessary to 
preserve the rights of defence…and would constitute an unjustified hindrance to the 
Commission in the accomplishment of its task under…the Treaty…”.196 This is an 
important distinction as an undertaking could just take the position of answering no 
questions, providing no information, and circumventing all data collection to completely 
undermine the DG’s ability to collect a sufficient amount of evidence to find an 
infringement; this would be in complete derogation of the DG’s powers conferred on it 
through Regulation No. 1/2003. Thus, pursuant to the right against self-incrimination, 
Defendants cannot be expected to say “yes, I am a participant in a cartel, or yes, I have 
entered into anti-competitive agreements that undermine market competition”, but they 
are mandated to provide information upon a request that falls within the purview of the 
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investigative scope (i.e. subject matter and purpose) as set forth in the search warrant. 
This mirrors the holding in Orkem, where the ECJ held that undertakings are expected 
to actively cooperate and provide all information that is related to the subject matter of 
the investigation, which consists of all pre-existing documents and factual information in 
its possession, even if it is later “used to establish the existence of anti-competitive 
conduct”.197 The most alarming rule of law the author found in relevance to the right 
against self-incrimination was in the Amann et. al. case, where the General Court held if 
a reply provided by an undertaking is self-incriminating, this “must be regarded as 
spontaneous cooperation…capable of justifying a reduction…of the fine, in application of 
the Leniency Notice…[but the] undertaking cannot claim that their right not to 
incriminate themselves has been infringed where they voluntarily replied…”.198  When 
looking at the totality of the above-cited law, the parties’ obligations are clear:  
Defendants must actively cooperate in competition proceedings by providing honest 
testimony (whether oral or written) upon request of the DG if said requests are within 
the narrow scope, subject matter and purpose of the investigation; Defendants are not 
obligated to provide statements of an incriminating nature, as being able to prove (by 
meeting the appropriate burden of proof), full culpability, is the responsibility of the DG.  
This section was not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of all the law related to 
the right against self-incrimination, but rather an overview of where the law stands in 
relation to this issue for a general understanding of both the Defendant’s 
rights/obligations and of the DG’s responsibilities.  The author will now ‘briefly’ touch 
upon other rights that attach during the preliminary fact-finding stage; it must be noted 
that the below rights will not be expounded upon in great detail, however, it is 
envisioned, that the reader will obtain a brief but requisite knowledge sufficient to 
understand the overall rights that attach as this stage of the proceeding. 
 
2. Legal Professional Privilege: Protection of Lawyer-Client Correspondence  
Another right of defence that attaches during cartel investigations is the ability for the 
undertaking to refuse providing any details regarding correspondence that ensued 
between it and its external retained counsel.199 More specifically, the right protects 
disclosure of any confidential communication that has as its intent the solicitation of 
legal advice, exchanged between the lawyer and client, for the purpose of preparation 
of the client’s defence.200 Said right can only be invoked when the DG is compelling the 
production of information, by and through external information requests or during an 
actual investigation.201 Regulation No. 1/2003 does not directly provide any guidance in 
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relation to the issue of legal privilege, however its protection is derived from the AM&S 
case, where the ECJ found in favour of the right for an undertaking to safeguard the 
confidentiality of its business communications with its external legal advisors.202 The 
holding narrowed the scope of the right to only protecting confidential communications 
between the undertaking and external counsel; this does not apply to in-house counsel 
or the legal department of an undertaking, as this would enable the concealment of 
crucial evidence necessary to undercover cartel infringement as in-house counsel are not 
deemed to be “sufficiently independent” from the cartel decision-making body.203 
Pursuant to AM&S, for the undertaking to protect the confidentiality of its business 
correspondence, said correspondence must have been prepared in furtherance of the 
client’s defence and with the purpose of obtaining legal advice “in relation to the subject 
matter of the procedure”.204  Interestingly, the protection of documents created for the 
purpose of a client’s defence covers those that take the form of “internal notes which 
are confined to reporting the text or the content of those communications” with outside 
counsel205; this can even be extended to documents made in preparation of future 
communications with said outside counsel.206 The validation for this is that “it may be 
necessary, in certain circumstances, for the client to prepare working documents or 
summaries, which will be useful, or essential, to that lawyer for an understanding of the 
context, nature and scope of the facts for which his assistance is sought”.207 Here, the 
documents do not even need to be exchanged between the lawyer and client, as long as 
they were prepared in furtherance of legal advice, in relation to the subject matter of 
the procedure, for the adequate preparation of the client’s defence.208 It must be noted, 
however, that it is for the undertaking to prove to the DG that documents they want to 
protect were created for the sole purpose of advisement and case preparation.209  
 
3. Right to Legal Assistance 
Similar to the aforementioned legal professional privilege, the right to legal assistance is 
not memorialized in Regulation No. 1/2003, whereby its protection is also derived from 
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ECJ case law.210 In the Hoechst case, the ECJ held that, “although certain rights of 
defence relate only to the contentious proceedings…other rights, such as the right to 
legal representation and the privileged nature of correspondence between lawyer and 
client must be respected as from the preliminary-inquiry stage”.211 Where Regulation No. 
1/2003 provides a bit more guidance is in Article 18(4), where it expressly allows for 
external counsel to answer interrogatories and information requests on behalf of their 
client; sub-section four provides in part the following,“…in the case of 
…companies…having no legal personality, the persons authorized to represent them by 
law…shall supply the information requested on behalf of the undertaking…Lawyers duly 
authorized to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients. The latter shall 
remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or 
misleading”.212 When applying the rule to inspections of business premises, there is case 
law directly on-point entitling the undertaking to have legal counsel present during the 
search.213 In paragraph 232 of the Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin case, the General 
Court held that “the presence of an undertaking’s…lawyer is possible… [during] an 
investigation, but that the presence of [the] lawyer cannot determine [its] legality. 
When an undertaking…desires, and…when it does not have… [a] lawyer at the 
investigation site, it can…request the advice of [one] by telephone and ask that lawyer 
to go there [investigation site] as soon as possible”.214 However, one must keep in mind 
that having a lawyer present, or subsequently calling for a lawyer, cannot impede the 
progress of the investigation, as in most cases, time is a critical element towards the 
proper recovery of anti-competitive evidence necessary for a finding of infringement.  
One can also argue, that the right of legal assistance can be expanded to inspections 
that are conducted in private homes/premises (by analogous application, pursuant to 
Article 21 of Regulation No. 1/2003).215 
 
4. Right to be informed on the Subject Matter and Purpose of Investigation 
Case law is also the principle authority behind the right to be informed on the subject 
matter and purpose of the investigation, as Regulation No. 1/2003 is relatively silent as 
to any guidance attaching to said right. In the AC Treuhand case, the General Court 
made a connection between the initial commencement of an investigation and the 
subsequent adversarial portion of the proceeding identifying the right for the defence to 
be informed of the subject matter and purpose of the investigation at the outset for the 
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enablement of adequate defence preparation at every stage of the proceeding.216 
Further, the Court held that because an “excessively lengthy preliminary investigation 
[could]…have an effect on the future ability of the undertakings concerned to defend 
themselves… [due to] the greater likelihood that exculpatory evidence can no longer be 
obtained or only obtained with difficulty”, it makes it vital for the DG to inform the 
defence of what it faces (i.e. subject matter/purpose of investigation) so an undertaking 
can facilitate a properly tailored defence in due time.217 The Court went on to cite to 
Article 11 of Regulation No. 17 (which has now been amended by Regulation No. 
1/2003) regarding the DG’s duty to inform, stating “in a request for information…the 
Commission is required… to respect the rights of defence... [and] to state the legal basis 
and the purpose of that request”; this also applies to a decision ordering investigation, 
whereby both the subject matter and purpose must be laid out in relevance to 
investigatory scope.218  Traversing back to the Hoechst case, the ECJ provided, even 
though “the Commission’s obligation to specify the subject matter and purpose of the 
investigation constitutes a fundamental guarantee of the rights of defence…the scope of 
the obligation…cannot be restricted on the basis…[of] the effectiveness of the 
investigation. Although the Commission is not required to communicate…all the 
information at its disposal…or make a precise legal analysis of [the]…infringements, it 
must none the less clearly indicate the presumed facts which it intends to investigate.219 
One must remember that when the DG initiates an infringement investigation, they 
usually conduct their initial appearance by surprise, to ensure evidence is not destroyed 
or tampered with due to the severity of the consequences that attach to hard-core cartel 
behaviour. Because the DG will be ‘raiding’ the undertaking’s premises, requesting 
documents and oral statements, going through business reports, targeting computerized 
data and collecting other important business-related evidence, it is paramount that the 
DG executes their search properly by indicating the subject matter and purpose behind 
their investigation to ensure that Defendants’ rights are upheld and that the integrity of 
their investigation will withstand heightened scrutiny on appeal.  The author will now 
briefly navigate through some of the current areas of potential fundamental rights 
violations faced by undertakings during DG investigatory proceedings; this will give the 
reader examples of current challenges with the EC competition regime before delving 
into the violative investigatory protocol of the LV NCA.  
c. DG Procedure:  Current Issues of Concern 
DG procedure has remained under stringent examination by undertakings facing cartel 
infringement allegations as many believe the current procedural protocol invoked by the 
DG falls short of the required fundamental guarantees provided by general principles of 
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EU law and the aforementioned Articles of the Charter and the ECHR.220  It is important 
at the outset to underscore that “…the rights of defence must be respected in all 
proceedings in which sanctions may be imposed”, as a finding of cartel infringement 
carries with it severe penalties making it necessary to take a closer look at whether the 
DG’s protocol upholds a Defendant’s fundamental rights.221  
One critical issue that has surfaced regarding the EC’s “sweeping” power is the 
potential need to obtain “appropriate prior court approval and supervision by an 
independent body before an investigation [can ensue] and effective ex post facto control 
by an independent court” to remain aligned with the intent of Article 8 of the ECHR.222  
In the holding of Delta Pekarny a.s. case, the ECtHR provided that, when applying the 
“principle of proportionality”, emphasis must be placed on investigations receiving a 
“sufficient degree of judicial oversight” to halt dawn raids that do not meet the threshold 
of “strictly necessary to attain the otherwise legitimate aim being pursued by the 
Authority”.223 In Stes Colas case, the ECtHR held that it is in derogation of the 
Defendant’s rights for the Authorities to execute a surprise inspection without being 
accompanied by “a prior judicial warrant and…a police officer with judicial investigation 
powers…”224, illustrating the vast power held by the Authorities “to determine the 
expediency, number, length and scale of its inspections”, which necessitates the 
protection of judicial scrutiny prior to the execution of a dawn raid.225 The ECtHR 
clarified its position in Niemietz regarding the need for adequate privacy protection of 
both professional/business activities and private activities, as people develop vast circles 
of relationships inside and outside of work equating to an overlap between the two 
functions; this makes it difficult if not impossible to “draw precise distinctions” as to 
where the privacy protection begins and ends.226 Thus, “… [the] right to privacy [also] 
encompasses the privacy of business premises or offices of legal persons and does not 
qualify or limit such right in comparison to physical persons”.227  Subsequently, in the 
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Roquette Freres case, the ECJ pointed to the holdings of the ECtHR paying deference to 
its case law regarding affording the right to privacy to business premises, and the 
heightened protection of the home of legal persons within certain limitations, 
concurrently with positing that there is perhaps a more expansive right of interference 
regarding business premises as reflected in the Article 8(2) exception.228 Because the 
Commission is bound to protect a Defendant’s right to privacy as memorialized in Article 
7 of the Charter (and Article 8 of the ECHR by and through Article 52(3) of the Charter), 
the above rules of law were aimed to prevent the execution of illegitimate investigations 
without meeting a proper burden or threshold as discerned by an independent authority 
prior to the execution of a dawn raid; this protection ensures legitimacy, predictability 
and independent verification in furtherance of protecting a Defendant’s privacy rights.  
Another issue of concern deals with “fishing expeditions” (i.e. conducting dawn 
raids without a pointed scope looking for any evidence that equates or can be used to 
prove cartel behaviour), where it is inadmissible for the DG to conduct investigations 
where they are reviewing, copying or seizing the entirety of an item’s contents (i.e. 
entire mail servers/share drives) just to identify sources of evidence for which the DG is 
not currently aware.229 Pursuant to the Roquette Freres holding, the ECJ stated, “…to 
ensure that there is nothing arbitrary about a coercive measure designed to permit 
implementation of an investigation ordered by the Commission…there [must] exist 
reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement of the competition rules by the 
undertaking…”.230  The Nexans decision, provides “…inspections carried out by the 
Commission are intended to enable it to gather…evidence to check the actual 
existence…of a given factual and legal situation which it already possesses certain 
information…the ECJ must satisfy itself that there exist[s] reasonable grounds for 
suspecting an infringement of the competition rules…”.231 Moreover “…if the Commission 
were not subject to that restriction, it would in practice be able, every time it has 
indicia…that an undertaking has infringed the competition rules…, to carry out an 
inspection…with the ultimate aim of detecting any infringement…[which is] incompatible 
with the protection of…legal persons, guaranteed as a fundamental right in a democratic 
society.”232  Thus, the Hoechst case provides that at a minimum, the DG must state with 
clarity the subject matter and purpose of the investigation.233 Here, the above rules of 
law were aimed to prevent the DG from easily executing on authorization decisions, 
                                           
228 Case C-94/00, Roquette Freres S.A. v Commission, Judgment of the Court, EU:C:2002:603, 
paragraph 29, available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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229 See Supra note 220, p. 7. 
230 See Supra note 228, paragraph 54. 
231 Case T-135/09, Nexans France SAS v Commission, Judgment of the General Court (8th 
Chamber), EU:T:2012:596, paragraph 43, available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62009TJ0135.  
232 Ibid, paragraph 65. 
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without providing some indicia of relevant scope regarding the subject matter and 
purpose of the investigation, so that an undertaking could comprehend the “particular 
context of a case…[and] the actual scope of the investigation”.234 This is a point of 
contention between practitioners and the DG’s procedural protocol due to its inattention 
towards crafting authorizations with sufficient “pointed reasoning and material scope” 
such that an undertaking can act appropriately “without compromising their defense”.235 
When traversing over to concerns with the legal professional privilege, the DG 
must not infringe on the correspondence that ensues between an undertaking and its 
external counsel if said exchanges are in furtherance of preparation for an adequate 
defence.236 In the holdings of AM&S and Akzo, “…[the] legal professional privilege in 
investigation procedures in matters of competition law…European Union law must take 
into account the principles and concepts common to the laws of the Member States 
concerning the observance of confidentiality [regarding]…certain communications 
between lawyer and client.237 Thus, it is imperative that confidentiality between the 
undertaking and its external attorney is stringently upheld, without even a “glance” 
afforded to the Commission in concern of such documents.238 In summary, safeguarding 
the legal professional privilege is of critical importance especially when the DG is 
allegedly executing warrants with convoluted context and a lack of precise scope. The 
aim of the above laws is to protect an undertaking’s ability to have meaningful 
conversation with its external lawyer in preparation of an adequate defense without 
violative interference from DG investigators uncovering documents and discussions with 
evidence of protected attorney/client correspondence.  
d. Concluding Remarks:  Importance of Viable Investigatory 
Protocol 
When taking into account all the aforementioned rights of defence, one can see that 
there is a clear link between the severity of sanctioning, the exploitation of the leniency 
program, and the critical need for safeguarding a Defendant’s rights to destabilize 
cartels and protect competition in the internal market. Investigations are a vital tool for 
the DG to uncover the evidence necessary for finding anti-competitive behaviour 
between undertakings, but with the increasing severity of sanctions that attach to cartel 
behaviour, and the ability for the DG to conduct investigations with analogous criminal 
investigative tools, strategy and protocol, it is imperative that Defendants’ rights are 
upheld to properly secure a later finding of cartel infringement, and in turn, higher 
overall penal sanctioning. In the following Chapter, the author will transition away from 
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the EC competition regime and take a comparative look at the differences between the 
law and investigative procedure in two MSs (e.g. Latvia and Ireland) regarding their 
search warrant procurement and protocol. Here, the reader will be able to apply the 
knowledge gleaned from the above chapters directly to an inherent problem appending 
to the creation and deployment of search warrants in the Republic of Latvia.  It is at this 
point in the article that the author will be able to illustrate all the interworking 
components of what it takes to maintain (and further develop) an efficacious leniency 
program to ultimately destabilize cartel behaviour for a more effective competitive 
market. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  JUDICIAL WARRANTS IN CARTEL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
a. NCA Regimes:  Parallel Competencies 
As denoted in Chapter Three, MSs possess parallel competencies to those of the EC 
pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003, whereby MSs are empowered to initiate, investigate 
and compile adequate evidence necessary to find infringement through application of 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU via national legislation.239 Thus, when MSs “apply 
Articles 101 and 102 to the cases they investigate, their procedures and powers of 
investigation are those available under national law”240, which equates to the procedural 
aspects of MS’s investigations not being harmonized due to said parallel competencies 
pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003.241 In terms of Defendants’ fundamental rights 
protection, Regulation No. 1/2003 provided that it respected, and should be interpreted 
and applied, with deference paid to the principles laid out in the Charter242; the Charter 
subsequently became binding on both MSs and the EC after the signing of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009.243 Thus, the Charter has a “binding legal effect equal to the Treaty on 
EU institutions and MSs when each applies EU law”.244 Moreover, the legal authority 
defining the principles applicable to MS’s competition proceedings can be found in the 
ECHR, which was “signed and ratified by 47 MSs of the Council of Europe EU… [and] 
enshrines [the] basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of everyone within the 
jurisdiction of any MS”.245 As highlighted above, the rights memorialized in the ECHR are 
not directly binding to the EC, but said rights do apply to the MSs, whereby the ECtHR 
renders judgments for findings of human rights violations occurring in MS 
jurisdictions.246 In summary, the aforementioned law provides that one must look to 
national law to discern MS’s specific procedural and investigatory protocol due to MSs 
having parallel competencies to promulgate legislation in application of TFEU Articles 
101 and 102 pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003; with respect to the safeguarding of 
Defendants’ fundamental rights in MS jurisdictions, one must look to both the Charter 
and the ECHR for relevant principles. Now that it has been identified where MS’s NCAs 
derive their authority to conduct evidentiary investigations, the author will turn to 
comparative methodology when analysing three MS’s laws in relevance to securing and 
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executing search warrants to uncover intrastate anticompetitive behaviour destabilizing 
national markets. 
b. Latvian Search Warrants:  Challenges with Procedural 
Protocol  
i. Research Background 
The inherent challenge when interviewing with 13 distinct MS NCAs becomes 
understanding the salient differences between system structures and procedural 
protocol, and how each impacts the exploitation of the leniency program, concurrently 
with safeguarding a Defendant’s fundamental rights, especially when focusing on the 
issues of search warrant procurement. When parsing through national legislation 
regarding search authorization thresholds, and subsequently interviewing the respective 
MS directors of cartel investigations regarding search warrant ex parte procurement 
burdens, the author identified important variations between the applicable law of IE and 
LV. Even though the author identified several jurisdictions with arguably overbroad and 
imprecise search warrant executory protocol, the author decided to focus this subsection 
on LV legislation, as several amendments have been proposed and higher court 
recommendations have been made, to align LV’s protocol with the safeguards 
represented in the Charter and the ECHR and to circumvent violations of the same. In 
this Chapter, said amendments and recommendations will be discussed, search warrant 
language will be addressed, and a comparative analysis will be conducted, to discern 
best practices that should be employed by LV to sharpen its search warrant procedure 
to withstand heightened rights-based scrutiny.  It must be noted that there have been 
subsequent amendments and modifications made to LV’s Competition Law that was 
implemented in 2016 (after the Author’s original research), but the main premise of the 
article remains to be true even after said legal modifications, making the instant 
research highly relevant and applicable towards positive change. The below subsections 
will provide an overview of the necessity behind needing legal modifications and will 
include updated sections to bring the law into its current state.  
ii. Latvian Case Study: Overbroad Search Warrants  
As reported in Chapter Three, the Saeima in conjunction with its NCA (i.e. KP) enacted a 
document entitled “Competition Law” as its national legislation to carry out its 
obligations under Regulation No. 1/2003.247 Prior to Section 9 superscript 1 being 
omitted from the current legislation on 12/05/2016, it encompassed the totality of the 
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law regarding the procurement protocol of search warrants in the Republic of Latvia.248  
At that time, Section 91  subsections (1) and (2), provided the following:    
“(1) A judge of a district (city) court on the basis of the legal address of the 
Competition Council shall take a decision on permission to perform the activities 
referred to in Section 9, Paragraph 5, Clauses 4 and 5 of this Law. The judge 
shall, within 72 hours, examine the submission by the ED and other documents, 
which justify the necessity to perform such activities, hear the information 
provided by officials of the ED[,] and take a decision on permission or refusal of 
the activity. 
(2) A true copy of the judicial warrant shall be sent to the Executive Directorate 
within 24 hours from the moment of taking of the decision”.249 
As one can see from reading the above passage, the legislation provided no guidance as 
to (1) what evidence needed to be contained in the “submission” from the Executive 
Director (hereinafter, “ED”), (2) what documents/information needed to be provided to 
“justify” the scope of the investigation, (3) what the deadline should have been for the 
execution and conclusion of the investigation, (4) what person(s)/locations should have 
been identified as the focal point of the search, or (5) what oral testimony needed to be 
elicited by ED officials, for a judicial warrant to issue. Moreover, there was no burden or 
threshold (e.g. probable cause, reasonable suspicion, more likely than not, etc.) set out 
in Section 91  of the legislation to identify the level of evidentiary proof required to 
necessitate the issuance of a warrant for the execution of forcible investigatory 
measures. Due to said inadequacies, complaints were made and recommendations 
proposed to introduce change to the law, which a relevant timeline and important 
modifications will be outlined and explained below. 
Current Section 9, paragraph 5, Clauses 4 and 5 (once referred to in Section 91) 
was revised in May 2016 in an attempt to make more transparent the powers of the KP, 
which provides the following: 
“4) on the basis of a judicial warrant, without prior notice and in the presence of 
police, to enter the non-residential premises, means of transport, flats, structures 
and other immovable and movable objects that are in the ownership, possession 
or use by a market participant or by an association of market participants, to 
open them and the storage facilities existing therein, carry out a forcible search 
of the objects and the storage facilities therein and perform an inspection of the 
existing property and documents therein including the information (data) stored 
on computers, floppy disks and other information media in an electronic 
information system.  
If a person whose property or documents undergo a search refuses to open the 
objects or storage facilities existing therein, the officials of the Competition 
Council are entitled to open them without causing substantial damage. During 
the search and inspection the officials of the Competition Council are entitled to:  
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a) prohibit the persons who are present at the site under inspection from 
leaving the site without permission, from moving and from conversing 
among themselves until the end of the search and inspection; 
b) become acquainted with the information included in the documents and 
in the electronic information system (including information containing 
commercial secret); 
c) withdraw property items and documents which have been found and 
which may be of importance to the case; 
d) request and receive derivative documents certified in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in laws and regulations; 
e) print out or record the information (data) stored in the electronic 
information system to electronic information media; 
f) request and receive written or oral explanations from the employees of 
the market participant; 
g) temporarily, but not longer than for 72 hours, seal the non-residential 
premises, means of transport, structures and other objects and the 
storage facilities therein, in order to ensure the preservation of evidence; 
5) on the basis of a judicial warrant, if there are justifiable grounds for 
suspicion [i.e. reasonable suspicion] that documents or property items that 
might serve as evidence of an infringement of this Law are being stored in non-
residential premises, means of transport, flats, structures and other immovable 
and movable objects in the ownership, possession or use of other persons, 
perform, in relation to such persons, the activities referred to in Clause 4 of this 
Paragraph in the presence of police.”250 
One can submit that these clauses (and their select modifications) are of obvious 
importance, but they still only provide parameters regarding permissible activities the ED 
can invoke ‘after’ the issuance of a judicial warrant; the clauses provide no clear 
guidance as to what needs to be submitted to the Court for the judicial warrant to issue. 
It must also be noted that it is only in Clause 5 that there is a burden/threshold 
introduced (e.g. reasonable suspicion) when the ED determines ‘during’ an inspection, 
‘on the basis of a warrant’ that documents or property items may serve as evidence, and 
as such, it may carry out its duties proscribed in Clause 4. Due to this legal shortcoming, 
it makes it abundantly clear that another section needed to be added to the Competition 
Act to ensure that the current state of the law does not allow for the ED to procure 
judicial warrants without providing enough indicia of anti-competitive cartel behaviour, 
which permits forcible investigations in violation of privacy rights of allegedly violative 
undertakings. The assessment and justification behind drafting this additional section 
(which currently can be found in Chapter II1, Section 10, entitled ‘Permission to Perform 
Procedural Actions’) will be expounded upon below.  
As stated above, due to the severity of the sanctions the KP can impose for a 
finding of cartel infringement, and the level of investigatory measures that can be 
exploited by the KP upon the issuance of a judicial warrant, competition dawn raids are 
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considered to be analogous to criminal investigations for which Defendants’ rights attach 
and must be safeguarded during every step of the proceeding, irrespective of LV 
operating a purely administrative system. In an effort to determine the appropriate 
language that should be utilized when drafting the new Competition Law section and 
judicial permission, the author believes that it would be useful to review what the 
Saeima deems necessary to promulgate in its ‘criminal’ legislation to protect a 
Defendant’s rights when procuring a criminal search warrant.  Thus, Article 180 of the 
LV Law of Criminal Procedure, entitled “Decision on a Search”, provides the following (in 
part): 
“(1) A search shall be conducted with a decision of an investigating judge or a 
court decision. An investigating judge shall take a decision based on a proposal 
of a person directing the proceedings and materials attached thereto. 
(2) A decision on a search shall indicate who will search and remove, where, 
with whom, in what case, and the objects and documents that will be 
sought and seized. 
(3) In emergency cases where, due to a delay, sought objects or documents may 
be destroyed, hidden, or damaged, or a person being sought may escape, a 
search shall be performed with a decision of the person directing the 
proceedings. If a decision is taken by an investigator then a search shall be 
performed with the consent of a public prosecutor.”.251  
As one can glean from the above clauses that LV criminal procedure mandates a search 
warrant shall include and describe who will execute the search, where the search will be 
conducted, other entities that will be involved with the recovery of evidence, what 
circumstances will trigger such action and the identification of the desired 
objects/documents that will be seized upon obtainment. Article 180 provides that a 
judge will make a decision based on a proposal submitted by a person directing the 
proceedings, and mandates a protocol be followed in cases of emergency or exigent 
circumstances.  Because search warrants are created by Judges in LV, and not pre-
written templates requiring a judge’s signature, it is up to the investigative director to 
present and file with the Court all existent evidence necessary for the Judge to be 
satisfied that all requirements are met to issue a warrant.  With this said, it can be 
argued that subsection 2, provides a bit more guidance as to what must be presented to 
the Court for a warrant to appropriately reflect the requisite scope that the authorities 
are allowed to exploit when conducting a search, thereby protecting a Defendant’s 
privacy rights. Here again, the difference between what must be presented for a 
criminal warrant vs. what is necessary to procure a competition warrant is quite different 
under LV law, but due to the severity of sanctioning and repercussions of hard-core 
infringements, both can be considered criminal such that Defendants’ fundamental rights 
automatically attach. Thus, without strategically reworking the law, said differences 
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could repeatedly become the impetus for complaints of human rights (e.g. privacy) 
violations against the KP by undertakings/individuals that believe their fundamental 
rights have been undermined by the current competition regime regarding KP’s 
preliminary investigatory protocol. This is because without precisely delineating the 
proper scope of an investigation, the warrant would permit unlimited exploration into 
areas of potential privacy which would be far afield from the intent behind competition 
law and in violation of Defendants’ fundamental rights, especially when the search 
facilitates the copying the entire contents of laptops, share drives, and mail servers 
usually used for cross-purposes.252 On the other hand, one must also question whether 
there should be two different protocols provided for in LV law to issue a judicial warrant 
(or make a judicial decision) when there are little to no differences between 
prosecutorial investigations and competition administrative investigations with the ED 
entitled to police investigatory rights during dawn raids. 
When refocusing the argument back to case law, in the Nexans case, the 
undertaking was pleading that the Commission’s inspection decision was “overly broad 
[and] vague [as to its] product…and…geographical scope”.253 The General Court upheld 
the first part of the claimant’s plea relying on Article 20(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003, 
which mandates “undertakings…are required to submit to inspections ordered by 
decision of the Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter and purpose 
for the inspection, appoint the date on which it is to begin[,] and indicate the penalties 
provided for in Articles 23 and 24[,] and the right to have the decision reviewed by the 
ECJ…”.254 The mentality behind the need to recitate “the subject-matter and purpose of 
the inspection…is a fundamental requirement not merely in order to show that the 
investigation to be carried out at the premises…is justified [,] but also to enable those 
undertakings to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate [,] while at the same time 
safeguarding the rights of defence”.255 In terms of safeguarding said rights, the Dow 
case goes on to say that the “obligation to specify the subject-matter and purpose of the 
investigation constitutes a fundamental guarantee of the rights of the defence…the 
obligation to state the reasons on which inspection decisions are based cannot be 
restricted on the basis…concerning the effectiveness of the investigation. Although the 
Commission is not required to communicate…all the information at its disposal…it must 
none the less clearly indicate the presumed facts which it intends to investigate”.256 In 
the appeal of the Nexans case, the ECJ dismissed the appellants arguments pointing to 
the Roquette Freres case, stating “the Commission is…obliged to indicate as precisely as 
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possible the evidence sought and the matters to which the investigation must relate”257, 
however, it is not “indispensable…to delimit precisely the relevant market, to set out the 
exact legal nature of the presumed infringements, and to indicate the period during 
which those infringements were committed, provided that the inspection decision 
contains the essential [elements]…”258. Moreover, paying deference “to the fact that 
inspections take place in the beginning of an investigation…the Commission still 
lacks…precise information to make a specific legal assessment and must first verify the 
accuracy of its suspicions and the scope of the incidents which have taken place, the 
aim of the inspection being specifically to gather evidence relating to the suspected 
infringement”.259 All the above case law clearly indicates that in order to properly 
procure judicial authorization the Commission (or the NCA) must outline the alleged 
subject matter and purpose to sufficiently delineate the scope of its investigation to 
uphold a Defendant’ rights; it need not relinquish all information, knowledge and legal 
analysis it possesses as it is still in the preliminary stages of gathering the requisite data 
to prove culpability of infringement, but it must provide enough information to allow for 
the undertaking to adequately understand the foundation of the warrant and how to 
appropriately cooperate pursuant to Article 20(4) of Regulation No. 1/2003.  
Because historically, Section 91  subsections  (1) and (2) of LV’s Competition Law 
failed to outline the basic requirements necessary to properly procure a judicial warrant 
concurrently with safeguarding a Defendant’s rights, the author targeted this as an issue 
to discuss while interviewing with not only the LV NCA, but also with other NCAs for 
comparative purposes. During the author’s interview(s) with the KP investigative team 
(and with the prior head of cartel investigations), the issue of Section 91 being “empty or 
void of detail” surfaced and was discussed at great length.260 The author was told that 
Section 91 remained in force as initially written for 20 years without any scrutiny until 
recently when an undertaking addressed a complaint to the president of the High Court 
about the inadequate/imprecise content and overbroad application of a warrant issued 
pursuant to Section 91.261  The complainant requested that the High Court find the judge 
of a district court who issued the warrant liable for disciplinary action262; thereafter the 
constructs of said complaint were analysed, the contents of Section 9 were scrutinized, 
13 national case materials were examined and recommendations were published by the 
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High Court for modifications of LV’s current investigatory protocol to better align it with 
safeguarding a Defendant’s fundamental rights pursuant to the Charter and the ECHR.263 
The recommendations were memorialized in a document entitled “Konkurences likuma 
9.panta piektās daļas 4. un 5.punkta piemērošana”, which the author will discuss in the 
following paragraphs.264  Said document provided recommendations in relevance to the 
Application of Section 9, Paragraph 5, Clause 4 and 5 and Section 91 of the LV 
Competition Law, whereby the most relevant discussions/recommendations were 
discussed to highlight the areas where the Court believed modifications should occur, 
and were analysed as to whether the modifications recommended were sufficient 
enough to align LV’s protocol with the provisions of the Charter and ECHR. 
The first chapter, entitled “Tiesu prakses apskats” provided the Court’s summary 
of the examined case law in relevance to judicial authorization protocol in LV; the 
second chapter, entitled “Pieņemto lēmumu saturs un būtība” provided details as to the 
contents and nature of judicial warrants, whereby both in conjunction provided the legal 
foundation relevant to the origins of the Court’s recommendations.265  The third chapter, 
entitled “Problēmas un to novēršana”, detected the problems with LV’s current protocol 
and how to invoke modification for preventative purposes.  In this chapter, the Court 
provided argumentation behind its mandate necessitating modification to the law, 
including (in part):  
(1) The activities enshrined in Section 9, paragraph 5, clause(s) 4 and 5 that 
permit the KP to enter non-residential premises, vehicles and other 
movable/immovable objects, to open them and carry out forcible search if 
necessary, perform an inspection of the existing property and documents 
(including the information stored on computers and on electronic information 
systems), withdrawing property items and documents that have been found and 
which may be important to the case, which of their nature are similar to activities 
of criminal proceedings, are regulated by Criminal Procedure Law and are 
recognized by the ECtHR. According to examined judicial warrants, “other 
market participants”, non-residential premises, other property of 
mentioned market participants, and employees of market participants 
are not identified. Without specifying the person and its property, it’s 
unacceptable that the KP, for an indefinite period of time, can carry out 
investigative activities that are similar to criminal proceedings. Such 
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practice does not comport with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
regarding its rules on investigative powers.266 
Taking the criminal procedure analysis a step further, the Court provided the 
following argumentation (in part): 
(2) According to Article 179 of Criminal Procedure Law a search is an 
investigative action whose content is the search by force of premises, terrain, 
vehicles, and individual persons for the purpose of finding and removing the 
objects being sought, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
object being sought is located in the site of the search; while Article 180 
of Criminal Procedure Law states that decision on a search shall indicate who 
will search and remove, where, with whom, in what case, and the 
objects and documents that will be sought and seized. This means that 
legality of the decision depends on a judicial evaluation of conditions, where 
specific persons are identified, but are not informed before the search. 
According to Article 40 Criminal Procedure Law an investigating judge 
shall be the judge whom issues search warrants, and who is tasked 
with the observance of human rights in criminal proceedings. Since, LV 
Competition Law has taken into account human rights by establishing 
judicial review (ie. Section 91 of Competition Law) for procedural 
activities carried out by KP, and because investigational activities 
carried out by KP may infringe [on] human rights, the investigating 
judge shall[,] with the observance of human rights[,] issue judicial 
warrants in competition investigations.267 
Irrespective of the High Court’s arguments in favour of tasking an investigative judge 
with upholding Defendants’ rights when issuing judicial warrants pursuant to Section 91, 
the KP informed the author that this would cause potential problems as an “investigating 
judge is strictly an institution of Criminal Procedure law”, whereby an investigative judge 
cannot issue warrants in administrative proceedings as s/he would have to “account for 
all principles established under Criminal Procedure law” of which all are not applicable to 
competition proceedings268; a challenge that will undoubtingly have to be ironed out 
before said recommendations could work seamlessly.  
The fourth chapter, entitled “SECINĀJUMI un IETEIKUMI”, provided the actual 
recommendations and conclusions of the High Court for both modification and 
implementation purposes, whereby the Court established the following five relevant 
recommendations: (1) the compendium of the matter before the Court is currently 
absent regulatory framework, (2) the judicial warrant should be issued by an 
investigating judge, (3) the judicial warrant should provide argumentation as to why the 
ED is permitted to take concrete action, pursuant to Section 9, paragraph 5, clause(s) 4 
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and 5, due to reasonable suspicion of the undertaking’s actions being in breach of 
Competition Law, (4) the judicial warrant shall indicate where, with whom, in what 
case, and what objects and documents will be sought and seized during the 
inspection as far as it is established beforehand, (5) the judicial warrant must 
indicate the deadline for which the KP can carry out the entirety of its investigatory 
activities.269 
As one can see from the analysing the above passage, the Court identified as 
necessary, and recommended as appropriate, the threshold of “reasonable suspicion” 
which must be present for the KP to meet its burden for a warrant to issue, it delineated 
what evidence must be presented by the KP for consideration of judicial authorization, it 
made the search warrant terminable by providing an execution and termination deadline 
date, and mandated the identification of the persons and products that are the object of 
pursuit. However important these recommendations might be in terms of preserving 
Defendants’ fundamental rights, it must be noted that not all said recommendations are 
currently enshrined in the LV Competition Act as rules of law. Even so, the author was 
able to obtain and translate copies of search warrants from the KP to identify the 
‘implemented’ changes in the content of judicial warrants before and after the publishing 
of the High Court’s recommendations.270  
Concurrently with the High Court providing guidance on the LV’s judicial warrant 
protocol, the Saeima was also promulgating legislation in furtherance of modification to 
the current Competition Act to help it better align with the Charter and the ECHR. The 
Amendments to the Competition Act, entitled “Grozījumi Konkurences likumā”, were in 
their second reading (at the time of the author’s original research) with several 
proposals of change being supported by the legislature’s commission; said amendments 
affected the scope of KP’s powers with the main changes focused on a more precise 
mandate to staff, a clarification of the judge’s authorization protocol and a delineation of 
the sanctioning standards and procedural violations by market participants.271  The 
following were the relevant proposed amendments to the law (regarding judicial 
                                           
269 See Supra note 264, pp. 7-8. Please note words that are bolded are meant to add emphasis. 
270 Lēmums satur ierobežotas pieejamības informāciju, “Decision Containing Limited Availability of 
Information”; search warrants were provided by email attachment on: 26 October 2015. Said 
search warrants were given to the author as follow-up correspondence after her in-person 
interview with the LV NCA. Search Warrant-Nr.1 provides an example of a judicial warrant issued 
in 2013 - before the publishing of the High Court recommendations; Search Warrant-Nr.2 
provides an example of a judicial warrant in 2014 - after the publishing of the High Court 
recommendations. Said warrants can be made available upon request to illustrate the 
strides made by the High Court to better align with protecting a Defendant’s rights in 
investigatory protocol and search warrant procurement.  (All identification information was 
redacted for confidentiality purposes.) 
271 Grozījumi Konkurences likumā, “Amendments to the Competition Act”, No. 269/LP12, 2nd 
Reading, available on: 
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS12/SaeimaLIVS12.nsf/0/DB2C6D6DE90D4A4FC2257EE6004C9073?O
penDocument. 
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warrants and KP activities), for which the author will list pursuant to each amendments 
provisional location in the Competition Act: 
-  “Section 9, Paragraph 5, Clause 3, was proposed to read:  “…pay a visit to any 
market participant or an association of market participants (including without 
prior notice). At the time of visiting the market participant, officials of the ED, 
presenting a written authorization specifying the subject-matter and 
purpose, have the right to:…”;  
-  Section 9, Paragraph 5, Clause 5, was proposed to read:  “If in time of the 
activities, …[the] competition council had obtained reasonable information 
that the property, information or documents, which may serve as proof of an 
infringement of this Law, are stored in the property of [an]other person[,] or is 
in this persons possession or use of existing non-residential premises, vehicles, 
apartments, constructions and other movable and immovable objects in the 
urgency of the case- if due to delay[,] the property, information or documents 
may be destroyed, hidden or damaged– the Competition Council [can] decide 
[on] an investigation [regarding] the activities of the person concerned, 
indicating the actions object and purpose. Inquiry, based on a decision of the 
Competition Council, [will be] carried out by the Competition Councils' authorized 
official and in the presence of the State Police”; 
-  Section 91 (now omitted), was proposed to read: "A judge of a district (city) 
court on the basis of the legal address of the KP shall take a decision on 
permission to perform the activities referred to in Section 9, Paragraph five, 
Clauses 4 and 5 of this Law. The judge shall, within 72 hours, examine the 
submission by the ED and other documents which justify the necessity to 
perform such activities, hear the information provided by officials of the ED and 
take a decision on permission or refusal of the activity. If the application can be 
reviewed without the Competition Councils hearing, the judge is entitled (may 
consider) to examine it in the written procedure."   
- Section 91 Clause 2 (now omitted), was proposed to read: The decision on the 
Section 9 of the fifth paragraph 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the activities referred to the 
authorization of the judge points at which market participant, association 
of market participants or persons, investigation activities [that] can be 
carried out, actions by the object and purpose of any property, 
information or documents to be searched, as far as it is known, and 
[an] activities deadline."272 
Although not all of the proposed amendments were listed in their entirety, one can see 
that the merits or essence behind the High Court’s recommendations were accepted by 
the Commission during its second reading. Currently, LV’s Competition Act has been 
revised to include a new Chapter II1 entitled Permission to Perform Procedural Actions, 
including Sections 101 – 104 to address the issue of judicial permission for procurement 
of a warrant in competition cases. The following are the relevant added sections 
reflecting the recommended changes for better adherence to a Defendant’s fundamental 
rights in Competition proceedings:  
                                           
272 Ibid. Analogous to the High Court recommendations cited above, said document is only 
available in the Latvian language; all translations were produced by the LV NCA investigative 
team for which the author relied on when writing the instant subsection. Please note words that 
are bolded are meant to add emphasis. 
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-  “Section 10.1 Jurisdiction for Issuing a Permission:  (1) A judge of a district 
(city) court on the basis of the legal address of the Competition Council shall 
take a decision on permission to perform the procedural actions referred to in 
Section 9, Paragraph five, Clauses 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Law. 
- Section 10.2 Submission Regarding Issuance of a Permission:  (1) In a 
submission regarding a permission to perform the actions referred to in Section 
9, Paragraph five, Clauses 4 and 5 of this Law, the Competition Council shall 
specify in respect of which market participants or association of market 
participants or persons the procedural actions need to be performed, 
the subject and purposes of these actions, and, to the best of its 
knowledge, what assets, information or documents are going to 
searched for. (2) In a submission regarding a permission to perform the acts 
referred to in Section 9, Paragraph five, Clauses 6 and 7 of this Law, the 
Competition Council shall specify the legal grounds and the scope of the 
data to be stored or not to be disclosed. 
-  Section 10.3 Procedures for Taking a Decision:  (1) The judge shall, within 
72 hours after having received a submission from the Competition Council, 
examine this submission which substantiates the necessity to perform procedural 
actions, become acquainted with the case materials of the Competition 
Council, hear out the representative of the Competition Council and take 
a decision either to issue a permission to perform procedural actions or to refuse 
it. (2) A true copy of the judicial warrant shall be sent to the Competition Council 
within 24 hours from the moment of taking of the decision. 
-  Section 10.4 Warrant on Procedural Actions:  (1) In its warrant permitting to 
perform the actions referred to in Section 9, Paragraph five, Clauses 4 and 5 of 
this Law, the judge shall specify in respect of which market participants 
or association of market participants or persons the procedural actions 
need to be performed, the subject and purposes of these actions, and, 
to the best of his or her knowledge, what assets, information or 
documents are going to searched for, as well as the time period for 
performing procedural actions.”273  
Irrespective of the positive strides taken by the Saeima, the author still has identified 
gaps in the Competition Act after its modification based on the aforesaid amendments 
as it remains void of expressly identifying or adequately explaining the necessary burden 
or evidentiary threshold that the KP must meet when requesting a judicial warrant 
(although reasonable suspicion was identified in the final version of Section 9 Paragraph 
5 Clause 5 it is only referred to in Article II1 Sections 101 – 104), it provides no guidance 
as to the types of evidence/documents/information required to present to the Court 
when testifying to the subject matter and purpose of the investigation to delineate 
proper scope, nor does it provide examples of concrete wording that must be testified to 
and memorialized in a warrant for its issuance to be validated.  The author will now 
briefly turn to the law of the Republic of Ireland to discern through comparative 
methodology what can be gleaned from the Competition Act of a fully criminalized 
                                           
273 See Supra note 116, “Competition Law”, Article II Permission to Perform Procedural Actions, 
Sections 101 – 104 , pp. 10-11. Please note words that are bolded are meant to add emphasis. 
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regime, and what strides said Act has taken to protect IE market competition 
concurrently with safeguarding a Defendant’s rights. 
c. A Comparative View on Search Warrant Protocol:  IE 
Regime 
As referred to in Chapter 3, the Irish CCPC (i.e. IE NCA) employs as its legal basis the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2014 (hereinafter, “CCPA”), in conjunction 
with the amended Competition Act of 2002, to carry out its obligations pursuant to 
Regulation No. 1/2003.274 One must keep in mind at the outset that the Republic of IE 
has a Constitution275 protecting the fundamental rights of persons (i.e. personal rights, 
family, privacy, education, private property and religion), and the IE CCPC operates a 
fully criminalized competition regime, whereby its Competition Act(s) include 
prosecutorial language and procedure for both penal fines and imprisonment under 
indictment in conjunction with the DPP. Accordingly, the judicial warrant provisions 
contain the language necessary to exploit investigatory measures analogous to those 
used in criminal offenses, due to the result of more severe prosecutorial sanctioning 
(e.g. fines/imprisonment), requiring pronounced deference paid towards safeguarding a 
Defendant’s fundamental rights. 
Within the ‘amended’ CCPA of 2014, Chapter 2, Section 37 (entitled, “Powers of 
authorised officers in relation to investigations under Act of 2002”), Subsection 3 
provides,  
“If a judge of the District Court is satisfied by information on oath of an 
authorized officer that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
evidence of, or relating to, the commission of an offense under the Act of 2002 is 
to be found in any place, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing an 
authorized officer (accompanied by such other authorized officers or members of 
An Garda Siochana [police] or both) at any time or times within one month 
from the date of issue of the warrant, on production if so requested of the 
warrant, to enter and search the place using reasonable force where 
necessary, and exercise all or any of the powers conferred on an authorized 
officer under this section”276;  
Regarding the activities/powers allowed during the investigation, one must look to 
Section 37, Subsection 2, which provides (in part): 
(a) “to enter, if necessary by reasonable force, and search any place at which 
any activity in connection with the business of supplying or distributing goods 
or providing a service, or in connection with the organization or assistance of 
persons engaged in any such business, is carried on; 
                                           
274 See Supra note(s) 102-104. 
275 Bunreacht na hÉireann, “Constitution of Ireland”, Articles 40-44 “Fundamental Rights”, pp. 
152-182, available on: 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/The_Constitution/February_2015_-
_Constitution_of_Ireland_.pdf.  
276 See Supra note 102, p. 40. Please note words that are bolded are meant to add emphasis. 
 73 
 
(b) to enter, if necessary by reasonable force, and search any place occupied by 
a director, manager or any member of staff of an undertaking that carries on an 
activity…, being, in either case, a place in…which there are reasonable 
grounds to believe books, documents or records relating to the carrying on of 
that activity…are being kept in it; 
(c) to seize and retain any books, documents or records relating to an activity 
found at any place…and take any other steps which appear to the officer to 
be necessary for preserving, or preventing interference with, such books, 
documents or records; 
(d) to require any person who carries on an activity…and any person employed 
in connection therewith to— (i) give to the authorized officer his or her name, 
home address and occupation, and…(ii) provide to the authorized officer any 
books, documents or records relating to that activity which are in that 
person’s power or control, and to give to the officer such information as he or 
she may reasonably require in regard to any entries in such books, 
documents or records, and where such books, documents or records are kept in 
a non-legible form to reproduce them in a legible form; 
(e) to inspect and take copies of or extracts from any such books, documents or 
records, including in the case of information in a non-legible form, copies of or 
extracts from such information in a permanent legible form; 
(f) to require a person…to give to the authorized officer any information he or 
she may require in regard to the persons carrying on the activity…(including in 
particular, in the case of an unincorporated body of persons, information in 
regard to the membership thereof and its committee of management or other 
controlling authority) or employed in connection therewith; 
(g) to require a person…to give to the authorized officer any other information 
which the officer may reasonably require in regard to the activity”..277 
As one can discern when comparing both the 2002 and 2014 versions of the IE 
Competition Act(s), as well as, what was revealed to the author during her in-person 
interview with the CCPC, the language of the 2014 Act was amended to provide a 
burden or threshold that the authorized officer must meet when eliciting testimony 
under oath for a warrant to issue. On the basis of the warrant, said Act also provides 
guidance as to (1) the evidence needing to display a connection between the alleged 
infringing activity and the actual persons/locations of the search, (2) that there must be 
reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence being sought will be found with said 
persons or in said locations, (3) that any requests for information be reasonably required 
by the authorized officer in furtherance of his/her duties, and (4) the information 
requested must be in the possession or control of said person and in connection with 
the alleged activities. During the interview, CCPC counsel and the author parsed through 
the differences between the language of the two Acts discussing the reasons behind 
why said language was carefully selected in the latter version, as precise word usage 
and/or modification can significantly change the scope of the investigation, the powers 
of the authorized officer when executing the warrant, and in terms of criminal 
                                           
277 Ibid, pp. 39-40. Please note words that are bolded are meant to add emphasis. 
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proceedings, the potential loss of an entire case due to investigatory technicalities.278 
Moreover, the language of both the 2002 and 2014 Act(s) was designed with the intent 
to pay an appropriate level of deference to the Defendant’s fundamental rights as said 
subsections signify and denote the subject matter, purpose and scope of the 
investigation allowing for the Defendant to understand the extent of their responsibility 
to cooperate and the underlying reasons for which they are under investigation for 
alleged anti-competitive behavior.  
 It must be noted that when obtaining an investigatory warrant in IE, the 
authorized officer creates a draft of the warrant for the judge to sign prior to the in 
camera hearing, which tracks through the statutory language, and ties in the 
appropriate statutes, legal elements and factual circumstances of the case (i.e. currently 
known to the officer) to satisfy the threshold of “reasonable grounds for suspecting” 
criminal anti-competitive activity, such that the judge will be satisfied that the burden 
was met and sign the draft warrant permitting the search.279 The authorized officer will 
also be expected to testify under oath to any inquiries the judge may have in relevance 
to the evidence presented appurtenant to the draft warrant.280 It will be expected that 
the authorized officer will set out the nature of the matter, explain the type of criminal 
behavior that was involved, identify and present evidence for each individual allegation, 
and link each allegation with the specific person or location in connection with the 
criminal behavior, such that the judge can be assured that the scope of the investigation 
is appropriate and that the warrant clearly indicates the subject matter and purpose 
without being imprecise, disproportionate or overbroad. The author underscores that 
although the IE CCPA does not overtly provide ‘examples’ of the specific types of 
evidence/documents/information required to present to the Court to delineate the 
subject matter, purpose and/or scope of the investigation, and fails to denote the exact 
procedure for obtaining a warrant, it does effectively lay out the burden/threshold that 
must be met, the deadline for which the warrant must be executed, and the context or 
foundation of testimony that must be elicited during an in-camera hearing for a warrant 
to issue.  
However, in May 2017, the CCPC’s search and seizure powers were rendered in 
breach of Article 40.3 of the Irish Constitution and Article 8 of the ECHR when in the 
execution of a dawn raid the CCPC obtained digital materials deemed irrelevant and 
outside the scope and purpose covered by the warrant.281 As background, in CRH Plc, 
                                           
278 See Supra note 105, Interview with J. McNally. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Arthur Cox, Dawn Raids at the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission set to 
change following a Landmark Supreme Court Decision, available on:  
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Irish Cement Ltd & ors vs. CCPC282, the CCPC conducted a search on the premises of 
Irish Cement Limited (ICL) (i.e. a CRH subsidiary) and seized the entire email contents 
of a crh.com mailbox related to Mr. Seamus Lynch (e.g. 96 gigabytes of data or 380,000 
files), a previous managing director of ICL and senior director of the parent company, 
CRH.283 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs alleged that some of the material seized was 
irrelevant to the scope of the warrant and should not be reviewed by the CCPC; the 
CCPC posited they had the right to review all documents seized pursuant to their Section 
37 powers and did not provide any “safeguards concerning irrelevant material other 
than making reference to its obligation of confidentiality” pursuant to Section 25 of the 
2014 CCPA.284 The Supreme Court of Ireland held that the CCPC was only entitled “to 
access, review and make use of materials” directly related to its investigation and that it 
must ensure the identity of the documents through proper engagement with parties “in 
a manner that respects their constitutional rights to privacy”.285 The Court highlighted 
the salient gap in Irish legislation underscoring the need for the CCPC to develop an 
appropriate procedure to engage with parties to proportionately identify relevant 
materials within the scope and purpose of the warrant and to properly execute on 
enforcement protocol during dawn raids.286 
In light of the above, the author will now traverse back to the LV Competition 
Act, with the help of the IE CCPA and subsequent IE Supreme Court holding, and 
critically analyse whether the strides that have been taken towards amending said law 
will be successful; the author will also make additional recommendations to (1) better 
align the Act with the Charter and the ECHR, and (2) ensure the Act provides 
undertakings with an even better understanding of the subject matter, scope and 
purpose behind the investigation, pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003. 
d. Concluding Remarks: Recommendations for Improvement 
As LV Competition Law currently stands, its language and content still fails to adequately 
provide or explain the threshold or burden necessary to identify the level of evidentiary 
proof required to necessitate the issuance of a warrant, it provides no guidance as to 
the types of evidence/documents/information required to present to the Court when 
                                           
282 CRH Plc, Irish Cement Ltd & ors vs. The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 
Supreme Court of Ireland, [2017] IESC 34 (29 May 2017), available on:  
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testifying to the subject matter and purpose of the investigation to delineate proper 
scope, nor does it provide examples of concrete wording that must be testified to and 
memorialized in a warrant for its issuance to be validated. The High Court and the 
Saeima had identified the potential human rights infringements inherent with ‘empty’ 
legislative provisions and were proactive regarding publishing recommendations towards 
needed improvement and promulgating proposals for amendments to the current law. 
Said proposals did encapsulate the essence behind the High Court’s recommendations 
by requiring an identification of persons/objects/locations and a deadline for which the 
search warrant can effectively execute, however even though the proposals were critical 
for better alignment with the Charter and the ECHR, they still lacked a number of 
important components that could make them even stronger and immediately impactful 
upon implementation. The following are the author’s recommendations to strengthen 
LV’s current investigatory protocol and procurement of judicial warrants: 
(1) Subject Matter and Purpose of the Investigation:  The author posits that 
alongside of the KP naming the desired persons/locations/objects and executory 
deadline in its submission to the Court, the law should also mandate what the KP must 
put on the record and testify to in order for the KP to obtain a warrant to perform its 
duties under Section 9, including examples of documents and information currently in 
the KP’s possession to indicate evidence of the alleged anti-competitive behavior. 
Moreover, the law should denote exactly how the evidence should be presented and laid 
out such that the warrant can properly reflect and proportionately define the relevant 
subject matter and purpose of the investigation in obeisance of a Defendant’s 
fundamental rights. The law should also include a reasonable and workable procedure to 
allow the parties concerned a mechanism to identify and separate evidential material 
that is determined to be unrelated or outside the subject matter and scope of the 
warrant, whereby the only evidence seized will be that which the KP is entitled to 
consider limited by the scope and purpose of the investigation.  
(2) Burden/Threshold of Proof:  The author recommends that the newly 
introduced threshold should be properly explained in Sections 9 and 10 to clearly define 
the burden necessary to satisfy the Court that the entirety of the evidence known to the 
KP at the time of submission rises to the level requisite to indicate there is an immediate 
need for a warrant to issue (or within 72 hours as denoted in the current law287). As 
reflected above, the High Court in its recommendations indicated that there should be 
“reasonable suspicion that the undertaking’s actions are in breach of Competition 
Law”288, but the Saeima chose not to adopt said threshold with adequate explanation 
into their proposal for which was in its second reading, illustrating the need for further 
explanation of its procedural importance. One can argue that burdens of proof are 
critical to ensure the validity behind the issuance of the warrant and for the Court/KP to 
substantiate a warrant’s contents when it is subsequently scrutinized for failure to meet 
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the requisite standards necessary to safeguard human rights. Thus, the newly 
introduced burden or threshold should be adequately explained in LV Competition Law 
to identify the level of evidentiary proof required to necessitate the issuance of a 
warrant by ‘defining’ the actual threshold in a separate provision such that it is overtly 
clear what the burden/threshold means and how it will be interpreted by the Court when 
analysing the evidence prior to issuing its findings within the context and scope of the 
search warrant. 
(3) Procedure on Warrant Execution:  As a compliment to competition 
proceedings being analogous to criminal proceedings in the eyes of the law, the author 
believes that LV Competition Law should follow the provisional language of LV Criminal 
Procedure Law, as it not only provides that “the search decision indicates which, 
where, in what case, and what objects and documents will be searched and 
removed”289 (which the Saeima acknowledged and proposed as an amendment), but in 
Section 182, it also outlines the procedures that must be followed when conducting a 
search.290 The author believes this language is important to include in LV Competition 
Law as such provisions would enhance the transparency and predictability of the KP’s 
investigatory actions, putting defendants on notice that ‘when’ their behaviour is 
detected and subsequently investigated, the procedural regimen is solid, does not 
infringe on Defendants’ rights, and severe sanctions will be upheld due to the enhanced 
investigatory protocol.  Resultantly, this will entice more exploitation of the leniency 
program and acknowledgement of anti-competitive behaviour.  It must be noted that 
the author does not believe that the additional Chapter II1 Articles 101- 104 amendments 
adequately address the insufficient protocol mentioned above; more needs to be done in 
furtherance of safeguarding a Defendants procedural rights in alignment with the above 
recommendations.291 
(4) Follow-on Evidence: The author posits that LV Competition Law should also 
denote what procedure should be invoked by the KP at such time when they are 
investigating and identify potential evidence that is not covered within the scope of the 
current warrant. A provision needs to be drafted such that it encompasses the protocol 
necessary for the obtainment of a “follow-on” warrant, to include the 
items/documents/evidence not covered in the language of the initial warrant issued by 
the Court. The Saeima’s proposals and later amendments cover what to do when there 
are issues of emergency or exigent circumstances in relevance to the potential 
tampering with or destruction of evidence292, but said proposals were deficient when 
accounting for evidence that could be uncovered that is outside the purview of the KP’s 
knowledge during the submission of evidence for the issuance of the initial warrant. It is 
clear that all evidence gathered by the KP must be done in accordance with the law and 
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291 Latvijas Vestnesis, Amendments to the Competition Law, No. 2016/104.1, published on:  May 
31, 2016, available on: https://www.vestnesis.lv/op/2016/104.1.  
292 See Supra note 271, Amendments to the LV Competition Act. 
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within the subject matter, purpose and scope of the search warrant issued by the Court; 
any evidence uncovered outside the parameters of said warrant should not be used 
against the Defendant by the KP (or Judge) when finding an infringement or at the time 
of issuing sanctions.   
The aforementioned recommendations were provided by the author to elicit a 
closer look at what could be modified or amended, such that LV Competition Law will 
better safeguard a Defendant’s rights concurrently with enhancing the destabilization of 
cartels, by paving the way towards a more efficacious leniency program. This can only 
occur with a more intense focus on providing the requisite level of transparency and 
predictability regarding LV investigatory protocol, such that Defendants will recognize 
that their behaviour will be severely sanctioned upon detection, making the utilization of 
the leniency program the dominant strategy to circumvent high fines and prohibition 
from public procurement.293 In the following section, the author will conclude by 
incorporating the unpinning of game theory and oligopolistic economic strategy, 
collating all the divergent system structures and leniency regimes, and tying in all the 
rules of law and provisional recommendations from the previous chapters to provide 
final recommendations on how to strengthen leniency programs by and through 
safeguarding a Defendant’s fundamental rights in furtherance of market competition 
within the EU.  
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CONCLUSION: THE LINK BETWEEN ALL INTERWORKING 
COMPONENTS 
Throughout the constructs of this article, the author employed two methodological 
approaches to uncover and better understand the diversity between the EC and 13 
Member States in relevance to different jurisdictional systems, decision-making vehicles 
and leniency regimes. These salient differences are important as they display a variety 
of approaches to investigatory protocol, evidential compilation and post-investigatory 
proceedings, which defines the level of importance that is attached to both transparency 
and predictability, and dictates to what extent each competition regime protects a 
Defendant’s fundamental rights. As the level of efficacy and efficiency of each regime 
was revealed during the empirical interviewing stage, the author drew conclusions 
between the potential success of the leniency program and the level of transparency 
that was built in to each regime, as it defined the extent to which the Defendant would 
participate in the immunity program and acknowledge its participatory behaviour due to 
the predictability of favourable outcomes stemming from the leniency structure. 
Transparency and predictability of a system are in many ways derivatives of Defendants’ 
fundamental rights protection and operate in tandem with the pressures on players to 
reveal collusive behaviour to circumvent severe sanctioning making game theory the 
underpinning of the leniency program. When applying the tenets of game theory to the 
leniency structure it corroborates why immunity has proven to be a prominent tool in 
the destabilization of cartels as it capitalizes on fear and timing to trigger maximum 
utility, to exploit the most lucrative option and to benefit from complete exoneration of 
fines/sanctions.294 The author then exposed differences in both EC and MS structures, 
including where each regime derived its legal authority, how each promulgated 
legislation in furtherance of its statutory obligations, and the extent to which each paid 
deference to a Defendant’s fundamental rights, as said diversity punctuates salient 
problems in terms of potential violative protocol, whereby comparative methodology can 
be utilized to posit solutions for better functioning systems.  
It is unequivocal that as sanctioning increases to levels analogous to those 
imposed in criminal proceedings, a jurisdiction must implement a more heightened and 
rigorous procedural regimen to ensure fundamental rights and due process are upheld, 
and employ “higher thresholds of proof, stricter evidential standards and more robust 
procedures”295 to align with the expectations and obligations set forth in the Charter and 
ECHR. It is well established that Defendants’ fundamental rights attach to every stage of 
the proceeding, but as jurisdictional diversity was examined it became clear that 
potential human rights violations permeated both the EC and a select number of MS’s 
competition regimes such that the author focused the article towards uncovering and 
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analysing violative investigatory policy and providing recommendations to strike a better 
balance between efficacious prosecution concurrently with safeguarding a Defendant’s 
fundamental rights in furtherance of a properly functioning leniency programs. Since EC 
procedure has remained under stringent examination by undertakings facing cartel 
infringement allegations, due to EC protocol falling short of the required fundamental 
guarantees, the author analysed three respective issues in relevance to EC’s sweeping 
power, including the need to (1) obtain adequate court approval and supervision prior to 
the execution of a investigatory search, (2) craft authorization with pointed reasoning, 
underscoring the subject matter, purpose and material scope of the raid, and (3) pay 
appropriate deference to the confidential correspondence between an undertaking and 
its external counsel to not interfere or compromise its defence. The author then 
investigated similar challenges inherent in LV’s search warrant procurement and 
execution process, and proposed recommendations to better align LV Competition law 
with safeguarding a Defendant’s rights. With the clear link that exists between the 
severity of sanctioning, the exploitation of the leniency program, and the protection of a 
Defendant’s fundamental rights, it becomes imperative that said rights are not 
undermined so a later finding of cartel infringement can remain viable under heightened 
judicial scrutiny, and so increased penal sanctioning can attach and demonstrate its 
utility as a preventative measure in the destabilisation of cartels. 
It is definitively understood that for a leniency program to remain a reliable tool 
in favour of more fruitful investigations and findings of infringement, the regime must 
ensure that (1) there is a sincere “threat of severe sanctions for those who participate 
in…cartel activity and fail to self-report”, (2) there is a perceived “high risk of detection 
by antitrust authorities if they [cartelists] do not report” and (3) there must be overt 
“transparency and predictability…throughout a jurisdiction’s cartel enforcement program 
so that companies can predict with a high degree of certainty how they will be treated if 
they seek leniency”.296 It can be anticipated that Defendants will be loath to participate 
in the leniency program without said elements being in place as they will not have a 
salient understanding to a requisite amount of certainty that the authorities will properly 
handle the evidence they will provide as immunity applicants, and in turn, will be unable 
to detect violative behaviour of other cartelists or secure viable sanctioning, as any 
effort in violation of a Defendant’s rights will not be upheld in a court of law. It goes 
without saying that if undertakings do not know to what extent they will be punished, or 
the benefits they will be receiving by admitting violative behaviour, they will be unlikely 
to divulge participating in an offense. Undertakings seek financial predictability when 
making decisions that could seriously affect their bottom line, thus, without said 
predictability companies might believe it is more secure to rely on the secretive nature 
of wrongdoing, than risk exposing ones violative behaviour without any assurance that 
severe sanctions can and will be imposed, or that promises of immunity will be upheld at 
the conclusion of the proceedings.  
                                           
296 See Supra note 57. 
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The author has recommended many areas where targeted modification to 
legislation could enhance obeisance towards Defendants’ rights, and the transparency 
and predictability of competition protocol in relevance to preliminary investigatory 
procedure, however, with every stride taken to strategically modify legislation, deference 
must still be placed on implementation of preventative education for not only 
undertakings and consumers at large, but also on the judiciary, as each 
entity/participant/player must work in harmony to understand the benefits of 
competition, uphold viable findings of infringement and properly balanced sanction 
propositions, and to condemn undertakings that undermine consumer welfare. As stated 
before, culture and mentality can influence forward movement towards destabilizing 
violative behaviour in the marketplace, and as such, proper budgetary allocation 
invested towards communal awareness of EC/NCA responsibilities, and on the resources 
available in the marketplace for companies/consumers to educates themselves on the 
benefits of competition, can go a long way towards putting all participants on an even 
playing field and circumventing hard core cartel infringements destabilizing competition 
in the marketplace.297 
In conclusion, if the collective desired outcome is to increase cartel 
destabilization and usage of the leniency program, to attract more leniency applicants 
and increase acknowledgement of cartel participation, to showcase the viability of cartel 
detection and imposition of severe sanctioning, and to develop an apposite fining and 
penal system that balances punishment with prevention, both the EC and NCAs alike 
must enhance the predictability of sanction and penalties, increase the transparency of 
procedures and internal decision-making, and fervently safeguard a Defendant’s 
fundamental rights for optimal competition in free market economies.  
 
                                           
297 It would be remiss to submit the findings of the instant article without returning to the issues 
posited in the initial methodology chapter regarding areas uncovered during empirical 
interviewing for further research in alignment with the enhancement of leniency program 
participation and protection of a Defendant’s fundamental rights; said areas include (1) 
inadequate transparency in Statement of Objections and the ability to comment on the 
complexity of economic analysis relied on by the Court and (2) the harmonization of access to 
leniency documents between departments of the same and different systems to proscribe proper 
documentary protocol to safeguard victims’ rights concurrently with protecting leniency 
application documents to ensure enhanced cartelist participation in existent leniency programs. 
